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CONGRESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
BRIAN D. FEINSTEIN* 
In an era of increased concern over presidential power, 
congressional oversight of the executive branch constitutes a 
substantial—but underappreciated—means of influencing agency 
decision-making. Scholars too often have overlooked it, and Congress 
is sub-optimally designed for its provision, but oversight has a 
significant impact on agency behavior. 
This Article provides a corrective. It presents the legal mechanisms 
that give oversight hearings their force and situates these hearings in 
their historical and legal context. In light of this framework and 
historical practice, the Article posits that ex post oversight hearings 
facilitate political control over the administrative state. Because 
oversight gets its bite from an implicit threat of legislative sanctions 
should an agency not change its behavior following hearings, however, 
committees’ decisions whether to pursue oversight hinge on the 
credibility of this threat.  
To test this theory, the Article introduces an original dataset of over 
14,000 agency “infractions,” i.e., agency actions that are potential 
subjects of hearings. Analysis of these data reveals, first, that oversight 
is most likely to occur when the particular preference alignment of 
Congress, the relevant committee, and the agency make the threat of 
new legislation credible. A second empirical analysis finds that, when 
oversight hearings do occur, they can get results; infractions that are 
subject to hearings are 18.5% less likely to recur compared to 
otherwise similar infractions that are not subject to hearings.  
These findings call into question the received wisdom regarding 
Congress’s role in governance. Whereas scholars focused on the 
political branches’ formal powers see Congress as a branch in decline, 
a more nuanced picture emerges when one also considers “soft 
powers,” like oversight. These findings offer a blueprint for greater 
congressional involvement in administration: to increase Congress’s 
role in governance, committee membership rosters should be 
representative of the larger legislature and committees with 
overlapping jurisdictions should be established. By redesigning its 
internal structure, Congress can promote more frequent oversight and, 
because oversight can be consequential, thereby strengthens Congress 
as a check on presidential administration. 
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In retrospect, it was only a blip on the media’s radar screen. But in the 
summer of 2000, tire safety held the public’s attention.1 That summer, the 
nation learned that failed Firestone tires were responsible for over one 
hundred deaths during the previous several years.2 Concerned about the 
perceived inability of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) to identify and adequately address the defect,3 Congress enacted 
legislation requiring the agency to establish a data-reporting and analysis 
system by mid-2002 under which manufacturers must submit to NHTSA 
information on accident-related claims.4 
Yet NHTSA, with more industry-friendly officials at the helm following 
the 2000 election,5 dragged its feet.6 In 2002, a House subcommittee 
convened a hearing where several legislators sharply criticized NHTSA’s 
administrator for the agency’s inaction concerning the defect information 
system.7 
Following the hearing, NHTSA made swift progress, completing the first 
phase of the system just nine months later.8 Two years after that, the agency 
issued the first recall based on analysis using the new system—which, 
																																																						
* Assistant Professor of Business Law and Legal Ethics, The Wharton School of the University of 
Pennsylvania. email: feinstein@wharton.upenn.edu. I gratefully acknowledge Michelle Minju Cho and 
Greg Solomon for research assistance, and thank Dan Carpenter, Adam Chilton, Jake Gersen, Tom 
Ginsburg, Daniel Hemel, William Hubbard, Aziz Huq, Jonathan Masur, Jennifer Nou, Eric Posner, 
Eleanor Powell, Neda Raeker, Eric Schickler, Glen Staszewski, Nick Stephanopoulos, Matt 
Stephenson, Lior Strahilevitz, Mark Tushnet, the Chicago Bigelow Fellows, and participants at the 
American Law & Economics Association annual meeting and the Administrative Law New 
Scholarship Roundtable. 
1.  See VANDERBILT TELEVISION NEWS ARCHIVE, https://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/search (search 
“firestone” OR “tire safety” between the dates of July 1, 2000 and September 30, 2000, for each of ABC, 
CBS, and NBC) (showing that the ABC, CBS, and NBC evening news programs aired 110 stories 
concerning “Firestone” or “tire safety” between those dates) (last visited Feb. 6, 2018). 
2.  Keith Bradsher, More Deaths are Attributed to Faulty Firestone Tires, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
20, 2000, at C2.  
3.  See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 106-423, at 1 (2000) (statement of Sen. John McCain). 
4.  Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act of 
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-414, 3(b), 114 Stat. 1801–02 (2000) (setting a June 30, 2002 deadline for creation 
of the system for death, injury, and property claims). 
5.  See Myron Levin & Alan C. Miller, Industries Get Quiet Protection From Lawsuits, L.A. 
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6.  See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., MH-2002-071, REVIEW OF THE OFFICE OF DEFECTS 
INVESTIGATION 5 (2002). 
7.  See The Implementation of the TREAD Act: One Year Later: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107 Cong. 
5–6 (2002) (statement of Rep. John Dingell, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce); 
id. at 28 (statement of Rep. Cliff Stearns, Chair, Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. 
of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce). 
8.  U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., MH-2004-088, FOLLOW-UP AUDIT OF THE OFFICE OF DEFECTS 
INVESTIGATION 5 (2004). The final phase of the system was completed in mid-2004. Id.  











incredibly, had become the government’s largest non-military computer 
database.9 
This sequence of events—Congress passes a law, the agency delays 
implementation, Congress critiques the agency’s inaction, and the agency 
improves—suggests that congressional pressure caused an otherwise 
recalcitrant agency to act.10 Yet the episode stands outside of the accepted 
view of congressional power. When scholars typically discuss Congress’s 
role, they tend to focus on the branch’s well-known, direct powers: 
primarily its lawmaking function, along with appropriations and 
appointments.11 Recent work on Congress’s other powers—most notably 
Josh Chafetz’s study of Congress’s “soft powers” concerning the freedom 
of speech or debate and each chamber’s powers to establish cameral rules 
and discipline its members—has begun to challenge this conventional focus 
on the institution’s legislative powers.12 Yet mechanisms, like oversight, 
that lie beyond those delineated in the Constitution remain 
underappreciated—despite the significant resources that Congress expends 
performing these functions.13 Given this incomplete picture, it is not 
surprising that the received wisdom holds that Congress’s role in 
policymaking, relative to that of the President, is diminished.14  
This Article provides a corrective. It contends that, as NHTSA’s 
																																																						
9.  Kevin M. McDonald, Separations, Blow-outs, and Fallout: A TREADise on the Regulatory 
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10.  See Press Release, Rep. Fred Upton, Upton Announces Recall on Ford Excursion Firestone 
Tires Issued between 2000 and 2003 (Feb. 26, 2004), https://perma.cc/9PSX-6T5S (credit-claiming by 
Rep. Upton, the principal sponsor of the Act and major participant in the 2002 hearing, concerning the 
2004 recall). 
11.  See Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 724 (2012) (noting that 
Congress’s “hard powers,” or its formal means of coercion, e.g., legislation, the power of the purse, 
impeachment, etc., “tend to be more familiar” than Congress’s “soft powers,” which presumably include 
oversight); Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV 61, 65 (2006) 
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committees and subcommittees convene a median of 221 critical hearings concerning agencies; for 
Senate committees and subcommittees, the figure is 82 hearings annually. Brian D. Feinstein, Infractions 
and Hearings Data Base. 
14.  See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and 
Politics: The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920, 1938 (2014); ERIC A. POSNER & 
ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010); BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010); Sanford Levinson & Jack 
Balkin, Constiutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789 (2010); STEVEN 
G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM 
WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008); THOMAS MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW 
CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACE (2006); William P. Marshall, 
Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 












response to congressional oversight hearings exemplifies, hearings provide 
Congress with a powerful tool to influence administration. This Article tests 
this theory with an original dataset of 14,431 agency “infractions,” which, 
as explained infra, comprise the set of issues from which Congress tends to 
select its subjects for oversight hearings. These infractions include critiques 
regarding a wide variety of regulatory implementation, enforcement, and 
personnel issues across all executive departments and major independent 
agencies, as raised in inspector-general reports, Government Accountability 
Office “top challenges” lists, and newspaper editorials. For each infraction, 
I identify, first, whether Congress held a hearing on the subject within one 
year after its mention and, second, whether the infraction reappeared in the 
dataset in the next year.  
The use of this large-scale dataset allows for the comparison of agency 
actions that are subject to oversight hearings with otherwise similar agency 
actions for which Congress does not hold hearings. After all, one cannot 
know the independent effect of the Transportation Recall Enhancement, 
Accountability and Documentation (TREAD) Act implementation hearing 
on NHTSA’s later actions without comparing that episode to a 
(hypothetical) other NHTSA implementation issue on which Congress did 
not hold hearings. This effort, the first large-scale, quantitative study of 
congressional oversight, answers two questions: under what conditions will 
oversight occur, and is this activity consequential? Taken together, answers 
to these questions will shed light on the broader question of whether 
oversight enables Congress to exert a degree of ex post control over the 
administrative state following legislative enactments. 
Empirical analysis concerning the first question shows that the particular 
preference alignment of Congress, the relevant committee, and the relevant 
agency affect whether oversight occurs concerning a given infraction. This 
finding is attributable to Congress’s bifurcated structure: committees are 
empowered to convene hearings, but only the full legislature may sanction 
agencies for continued non-compliance following hearings. This structure 
encourages committees to ignore some infractions that Congress might 
prefer to probe, based on the committees’ fears that convening hearings 
could motivate Congress to enact legislative changes that the committees 
oppose. Essentially, committees—mindful that their parent chamber’s 
preferences may differ from their own—make strategic decisions 
concerning which agencies they take to task and which they ignore.15 
																																																						
15.  See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition for Control of 
Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443 (2003); Steven Shimberg, Checks and Balance: Limitations on 
the Power of Congressional Oversight, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 245 (1991). For instance, the 
House subcommittee that convened the TREAD Act oversight hearing in 2002 also possessed 











A second analysis finds that, when it occurs, oversight often is 
consequential, changing agency behavior for a statistically significant 
18.5% of infractions, relative to otherwise similar infractions for which 
oversight does not occur. To put that figure in perspective: agencies commit 
an average of 656 infractions per year, of which 239 infractions continue 
(or reoccur) the next year; by holding oversight hearings, Congress prevents 
an additional forty-seven infractions per year from reappearing in the 
dataset in the next year on average. Oversight alters agency behavior—
moving it towards congressional preferences on issues ranging from the 
level of regulatory enforcement to the creation of programs that stretch 
agencies’ statutory authority, as well as concerning more run-of-the-mill 
issues such as waste, fraud, and abuse—an average of 89 times per year. 
These findings have implications for our understanding of the roles that 
all three branches play in the administrative state. First, the finding that 
committees strategically decline to hold hearings based on the preference 
alignment of Congress, the committee, and the relevant agency shows a 
subtle majoritarian dynamic at work in Congress’s internal organization. 
Although committee-based oversight can be remarkably impactful, outlier 
committees are less likely to engage in oversight. Thus, the existence of a 
bifurcated congressional principal provides a majoritarian check on 
unrepresentative committees—and cuts against arguments favoring strong 
presidential administration based on the premise that congressional control 
supposedly involves control by outlier committees.  
Prescriptively, that finding suggests that those interested in enhancing 
Congress’s capacity ought to do away with two of the branch’s institutional 
features: legislators’ self-selection onto committees and the granting of 
exclusive jurisdictions to committees. The current practice of allowing 
legislators to select their committee assignments yields committees that are 
unrepresentative of floor preferences. As explained infra, outlier 
committees refrain from convening oversight hearings in instances where 
Congress would prefer hearings to occur. Thus, creating committees that 
reflect congressional preferences would foster greater oversight. Similarly, 
granting a single committee property rights to oversee a given agency 
reduces the likelihood that the agency will be subject to oversight if that 
committee’s preferences are not properly aligned with those of Congress 
and the agency. Accordingly, placing agencies under the non-exclusive 
control of multiple committees would encourage greater oversight. 
																																																						
jurisdiction over the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). See H.R. REP. NO. 107-802 (2003). 
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Second, the finding that oversight can substantially alter agency behavior 
indicates that Congress’s position vis-à-vis the White House is not as 
diminished as some suggest. In recent years, scholars have begun to push 
back against the conventional perception of an enfeebled Congress.16 This 
Article contributes to this nascent reassessment by adding oversight as 
among Congress’s soft powers that provide the branch with a source of 
control over administrative agencies.17  
Finally, these findings suggest that concerns that administrative law 
doctrines leave the executive branch without supervision deserve 
reconsideration. In recent years, a growing chorus of jurists and scholars has 
voiced concerns that deference doctrines strip agencies of any checks, 
judicial or legislative, on their actions.18 That oversight provides Congress 
with a powerful mechanism to influence agency behavior—and that 
Congress has the ability to restructure its internal institutions to promote 
even greater oversight, should it so desire—belies this notion. Thus, these 
findings provide a rejoinder to critics of judicial deference to agencies on 
these grounds.  
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of the 
mechanics of congressional oversight, including the historical practices and 
legal framework that shape how Congress conducts oversight. Part II 
examines the circumstances in which agencies are subject to oversight or 
ignored, emphasizing how congressional institutions—specifically, the 
committee system—impact the branch’s oversight activities. Part III 
assesses whether oversight is consequential, examining the extent to which 
hearings alter future agency behavior. Finally, Part IV discusses 
implications of these findings and presents a blueprint for Congress to better 
utilize its oversight function as a check on growing executive authority. 
I. FUNDAMENTALS 
A. Hearings and Alternatives 
This Article examines one form of congressional monitoring of the 
administrative state: oversight hearings convened by committees and 
subcommittees. Congress’s oversight work, naturally, is not limited to on-
																																																						
16.  See, e.g., CHAFETZ, supra note 12, at 37; David R. Mayhew, Congress as a Handler of 
Challenges: The Historical Record, 29 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 185, 211 (2015); Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the 
Executive (by Law or by Politics), 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 777, 779–80 (2012). 
17.  Cf. Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 573 (2008) (on the persuasive influence of post-enactment congressional or cameral 
resolutions). 
18.  See infra Section IV.E. 











the-record hearings.19 Actions ranging from informal, largely consequence-
less discussions between committee staffers and members of the senior 
executive service to, at the farthest extreme, presidential impeachment and 
conviction trials can all be considered oversight. Most oversight activity 
occurs at the lower end of this spectrum, with legislators, staff members, 
and congressional support agencies—most prominently the Government 
Accountability Office—communicating with agency personnel both to 
receive information and to convey recommendations.20 Operating under 
time and resource constraints, legislators outsource some of this 
information-gathering to affected interest groups and provide mechanisms 
by which these groups can alert allied legislators of disfavored agency 
action.21 
More broadly, members of Congress also exert ex post influence over the 
administrative state via the appropriations process, information-forcing 
reporting requirements, the confirmation process, and casework.22 
Committee-based legislative vetoes—which persist as tacit understandings 
between committees and agencies in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha that the 
mechanism is unconstitutional—provide another means of ex post control.23 
In a sense, any congressional intervention in the executive branch could be 
viewed as performance of Congress’s oversight function.24 Seen in this 
light, Carl Friedrich’s observation that policymaking “is a continuous 
process, the formation of which is inseparable from its execution” holds 
true.25 
That virtually any legislative intervention that lies beyond Congress’s 
formal powers can be classified as oversight stymies potential comparisons 
of the relative efficacy of Congress’s many means of influencing the 
administrative state. For one, legislators utilize these mechanisms—e.g., 
committee hearings, legislative support agency audits, casework, informal 
																																																						
19.  See Beermann, supra note 11, at 122. 
20.  JOEL ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL 
OVERSIGHT 132 (1990).  
21.  CHRISTOPHER FOREMAN, SIGNALS FROM THE HILL: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND THE 
CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL REGULATION 13 (1989). 
22.  See Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective 
Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1482 (2015). 
23.  See LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RS22132, LEGISLATIVE VETOES AFTER 
CHADHA (2005) (identifying hundreds of legislative vetoes in effect in 2005); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919 (1983). 
24.  See FREDERICK KAISER, WALTER OLESZEK & TODD TATELMAN, CONGRESSIONAL 
OVERSIGHT MANUAL 78–80 (2011) (classifying casework, audits, and the monitoring of the Federal 
Register as forms of oversight).  
25.  Carl Joachim Friedrich, Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility, in 












staff contacts, etc.—for different purposes; one would not expect, for 
instance, a full-day hearing to investigate an undelivered Social Security 
check. Further, with so many of these Congress-agency contacts being 
informal and unrecorded (e.g., staff-level phone conversations), 
measurement problems abound.  
Thus, the scope of this Article is more limited; it focuses exclusively on 
committee and subcommittee oversight hearings, which are the most direct, 
observable form of congressional monitoring. Congress holds hundreds of 
hearings annually, most of which occur in committees and subcommittees 
that have jurisdictional mandates and dedicated staff resources to perform 
this function.26 These hearings are the most public, performative, high-
stakes manner in which Congress oversees the administrative state.27 
Hearings—more than any other form of monitoring—enjoy a legal 
framework that encourages their success. Most importantly, committees are 
authorized to issue subpoenas to compel testimony at hearings.28 If an 
individual fails to comply with a subpoena, either chamber may cite that 
individual for contempt of Congress via one of three mechanisms: 
Congress’s inherent contempt power,29 a criminal contempt statute available 
to both chambers,30 or a civil contempt statute available to the Senate.31 In 
addition, witnesses that, whether under oath or not, knowingly make a false 
statement concerning a material issue in the presence of a quorum of 
committee members are subject to prosecution.32 Full committees, by a two-
thirds vote, also have the power to compel a witness’s testimony following 
that individual’s assertion of his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination.33 In these circumstances, the committee may compel that 
witness’s testimony by obtaining a court order granting the witness 
immunity from future criminal prosecution.34 Accordingly, the legal 
framework that hearings enjoy may make them a particularly effective form 
																																																						
26.  See KAREN L. HAAS, CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, LIST OF STANDING 
COMMITTEES (2018), https://perma.cc/N8PA-UY4D (listing oversight subcommittees nested in ten 
House authorization committees, as well as the Committee on Oversight & Government Reform, which 
contains six subcommittees). 
27.  See Beermann, supra note 11, at 122. 
28.  See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975) (reaffirming the 
constitutionality of this subpoena power); KAREN L HAAS, CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
114th Cong., RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, R. XI (2015) (authorizing all standing 
committees and subcommittees to issue subpoenas); SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION, 
SENATE MANUAL, S. DOC. NO. 113-1, Rule XXVI (2014) (similar).  
29.  See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 (1821).  
30.  2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194 (2012). 
31.  2 U.S.C. §§ 288b, 288d; 28 U.S.C. § 1365.  
32.  18 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a), (c)(2). 
33.  KAISER, OLESZEK & TATELMAN, supra note 24, at 32. 
34.  Id. 











of oversight. While acknowledging that hearings are one of many possible 
congressional interventions into administration, this study therefore focuses 
on hearings. 
B. Historical Practice 
As with many congressional functions, committee oversight hearings 
trace their origins to the British Parliament.35 During the 1680s—roughly 
contemporaneous with the expansion of parliamentary power in the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688—parliamentary committees investigated 
alleged misappropriations of funds by the navy, dissatisfaction with the 
English army’s conduct of the Williamite War in Ireland, and the East India 
Company’s declaration of martial law on a remote island.36 Colonial 
legislatures in America adopted the practice, investigating, inter alia, 
corruption in the granting of corporate charters, misconduct by 
gubernatorial officials, and the disbursement of public funds.37  
The U.S. Congress first addressed the question of whether it has the 
authority to oversee executive affairs on March 27, 1792.38 On that date, the 
House voted down a resolution directing the President to investigate the 
army’s defeat by Shawnee and Miami forces in the Battle of the Wabash.39 
In its place, the House adopted an alternative resolution “empower[ing] [a 
House investigative committee] to call for such persons, papers, and 
records, as may be necessary to assist their inquiries.”40 
From the early Republic until the 1910s, congressional oversight 
occurred on an ad hoc basis, with most investigations conducted by short-
term committees established to examine discrete subjects.41 Investigations 
typically occurred every few years during this period.42 The frequency and 
depth of investigations began to increase in the early twentieth century. This 
development is attributable to the confluence of two related trends: the rise 
of the Progressive movement and the growing popularity of investigatory 
journalists known as muckrakers.43 Congressional attention to oversight 
continued to increase through World War II, when Congress largely tabled 
																																																						
35.  See James M. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of 
Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REV. 153, 162 (1926).  
36.  See id.  
37.  See id. at 165–66.  
38.  Id. at 170. 
39.  Id. 
40.  3 ANNALS OF CONG. 490–94 (1792). 
41.  See DAVID R. MAYHEW, AMERICA’S CONGRESS: ACTIONS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE, JAMES 
MADISON THROUGH NEWT GINGRICH 82–83 (2002); Landis, supra note 35, at 171–210. 
42.  See MAYHEW, supra note 41, at 82–83; Landis, supra note 35, at 171–210. 












its legislative function in favor of monitoring the war effort, most 
prominently through the career-making Truman Committee.44  
From the mid-twentieth century through the present, oversight hearings 
have been a near-constant presence in Congress.45 The vast majority of 
hearings during this period—and, hence, the vast majority of hearings 
analyzed in this Article—probe relatively narrow subjects, e.g., the Bureau 
of Land Management’s fee schedules for agricultural and extractive uses of 
public land, the National Weather Service’s efforts to commercialize its 
intellectual property, etc. Occasionally, however, Congress addresses high-
profile subjects, conducting compelling, televised hearings that become 
embedded in the public conscience.46 Often, a single proper noun is all that 
is needed to evoke these complex, dramatic events: Kefauver, McCarthy, 
Watergate, Iran-Contra, Benghazi.  
Although high-profile hearings that occurred during the period under 
study in this Article are included in my analysis, they are only part of the 
story. This project’s aims are broader: to shine a light on Congress’s often 
overlooked, routine oversight of administrative agencies, showing that the 
use of this basic function enables Congress to influence executive-branch 
outcomes following the passage of laws. 
C. Legal Authority 
A combination of Supreme Court case law, statutes, and congressional 
rules governs the conduct of congressional overseers. Supreme Court 
opinions, largely from the early- to mid-twentieth century, define the 
constitutionally permissible scope of congressional investigations; a 
combination of public law and congressional rules, enacted in bursts of 
reform-minded legislative activity during the 1940s and 1970s, establishes 
the institutional structures through which Congress conducts oversight.  
1. Constitutional Authority 
Although the Constitution does not expressly grant Congress the power 
to conduct oversight, the Supreme Court has held that the “power of the 
Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process.”47 
Thus, Congress’s oversight powers are implied by the Constitution and are 
																																																						
44.  See id. at 82–87. 
45.  See DOUGLAS L. KRINER & ERIC SCHICKLER, INVESTIGATING THE PRESIDENT: 
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46.  See MAYHEW, supra note 41, at 82–90.  
47.  Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957). 











coterminous with the branch’s lawmaking powers.48 This connection 
between oversight and lawmaking is crucial; Congress’s oversight power 
must be applied “in aid of the legislative function.”49 
In determining whether a committee hearing meets this constitutional 
requirement, the Supreme Court adopts a broad definition of “legislative 
function.” For instance, in McGrain v. Daugherty, the Court held that a 
Senate investigation into the Teapot Dome scandal was constitutionally 
valid,50 despite the vagueness of the language in the Senate resolution 
authorizing the hearings: to obtain “information necessary as a basis for 
such legislative and other action as the Senate may deem necessary and 
proper.”51 Acknowledging that “[a]n express avowal of the object [of the 
hearings] would have been better,” the Court nonetheless held that the 
Senate’s stated purpose was constitutionally adequate.52 “The only 
legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the investigation was to 
aid it in legislating,” the Court concluded, “and we think the subject-matter 
was such that the presumption should be indulged that this was the real 
object.”53 
This broad definition of legislative purpose notwithstanding, the 
Supreme Court does not give Congress carte blanche to conduct hearings. 
Since congressional investigations resemble aspects of both the legislative 
and judicial processes, it is unsurprising that the Court has held that variants 
of well-established limits on these processes also apply to oversight 
hearings.54 For example, because Congress cannot enact laws that infringe 
on the First Amendment, neither can it compel testimony at hearings whose 
only conceivable legislative purpose would infringe on the First 
Amendment. In Watkins v. United States, for instance, the Court reversed 
on First Amendment grounds a conviction for contempt of Congress 
following a union official’s refusal to testify before the House Committee 
on Un-American Activities on alleged communist involvement in organized 
labor.55 The Watkins Court reasoned that since “an investigation is part of 
																																																						
48.  See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 453–54 (1977); 
Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 505–06 (1975); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 
109, 134 (1959); Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187; McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 156–75 (1927). 
49.  Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 189 (1880). 
50.  McGrain, 273 U.S. at 177–82. 
51.  68 CONG. REC. 7217 (1924). 
52.  McGrain, 273 U.S. at 178. 
53.  Id. 
54.  See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959) (“Congress . . . must exercise its 
[investigative] powers subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action, more 
particularly in the context of [the oversight activities in] this case the relevant limitations of the Bill of 
Rights.”). 












lawmaking,” it is “subject to the command that the Congress shall make no 
law abridging freedom of speech or press or assembly.”56 
The Supreme Court also has indicated in dicta that the Fourth 
Amendment’s bar on unreasonable searches and seizures extends to 
congressional investigations. In McPhaul v. United States—another case 
originating with an Un-American Activities Committee investigation—the 
Court applied the same standard to assess the reasonableness of the 
committee’s subpoenas as it applied to Fourth Amendment challenges to 
subpoenas issued in judicial and administrative proceedings.57 
Concerning the Fifth Amendment, the Court has stated in dicta that the 
privilege against self-incrimination is available to witnesses in 
congressional investigations58 despite the Amendment’s express reference 
to persons “in any criminal case.”59 The Due Process Clause also applies to 
congressional investigations, mandating that “the pertinency of the 
interrogation to the topic under the congressional committee’s inquiry must 
be brought home to the witness at the time the questions are put to him.”60 
Beyond the aforementioned constitutional limitations, however, courts 
are reluctant to apply procedural safeguards that are typically associated 
with judicial proceedings to the congressional context. For instance, there 
is no congressional analogue to the right of a defendant in a judicial 
proceeding to cross-examine witnesses pursuant to the Due Process and 
Confrontation clauses.61 Courts are even more deferential to Congress 
concerning the application of common-law privileges to oversight 
hearings.62 For example, committees exercise complete discretion over 
whether to grant testimonial privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege, 
to witnesses.63 The judiciary’s unwillingness to extend other constitutional 
and common-law protections present in the judicial process to congressional 
investigations arguably is itself rooted in the Constitution; this general 
deference to congressional committees to devise their own procedural 
																																																						
56.  Id. at 197. 
57.  364 U.S. 372, 382–83 (1960). 
58.  Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955). 
59.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
60.  Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 467–68 (1961); see also Barenblatt v. United States, 
360 U.S. 109, 123–24 (1959); Watkins, 354 U.S. at 214–15. 
61.  See United States v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670, 678–81 (D.C. Cir. 1970).  
62.  See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21, 39 (D.D.C. 1998) aff'’d in part, 
rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (rejecting an 
assertion of work-product immunity by the White House Counsel’s Office, based on the Office’s failure 
to show that potential future congressional investigations constitute adversarial proceedings of the type 
for which the privilege ordinarily may apply). 
63.  See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 30–38. 











safeguards finds support in the Rules of Proceedings Clause.64 
2. Statutory Authority 
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 provides the foundation for 
the contemporary Congress’s oversight work.65 The Act mandates that all 
House and Senate standing committees “exercise continuous watchfulness 
of the execution [of laws] by the administrative agencies,” and provides 
committees with enhanced tools—namely, professional committee staffs 
and strengthened congressional support agencies—to help achieve this 
goal.66 The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 and the Congressional 
Budget Act of 1974 further increased committee staffs and the scope and 
budgets of congressional support agencies.67 Beginning in the late 1970s, 
Congress augmented its information-gathering abilities—or, depending on 
one’s perspective, outsourced much of this tedious and resource-intensive 
function to the executive branch itself—by establishing positions within the 
executive branch charged with issuing reports to Congress and the general 
public,68 mandating that the executive periodically provide Congress with 
certain pre-specified information,69 and protecting executive branch 
whistleblowers from reprisal.70 
3. Cameral Rules 
Oversight hearings take place exclusively in committees and 
subcommittees.71 As a formal matter, only the chair of the relevant 
committees or subcommittee typically may call a hearing.72 In many 
																																																						
64.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings . . . 
.”). 
65.  See Beermann, supra note 11, at 122; see also Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. 
L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (1946). 
66.  Legislative Reorganization Act, supra note 65. 
67.  Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297, 325–29 (1974); 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-510, 84 Stat. 1140, 1168–71, 1173–79, 1181–
85 (1974). 
68.  See Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-409, 122 Stat. 4302 (2008); 
Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-576, 104 Stat. 2838 (1990); Inspector General 
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (1978). 
69.  See GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866, 3866–84 
(2010); Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163 (1995); Government 
Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285, 285–96 (1993). 
70.  See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034 (2009); 
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1213–1214 (2000 ed. & Supp. III). 
71.  See H.R. Res. 5, rule X, 133th Cong. (2013) (enacted); SENATE MANUAL, rule XXV, 112th 
Cong. (2011), https://perma.cc/8TM5-QBKK. 












committees, however, well-established norms dictate that the chair will call 
a hearing at the behest of a significant number—often, but not always, a 
majority—of the group’s majority party membership.73 Once called, a 
hearing in a House committee or subcommittee may be conducted if at least 
two committee or subcommittee members are in attendance; for most Senate 
committees and subcommittees, hearings may be held with only one 
member present.74 Minority party members enjoy no formal rights to hold 
hearings or issue subpoenas.75 Still, minority party members may participate 
fully in the questioning of witnesses and, in the House, also may call their 
own witnesses at the request of a majority of the minority members.76 
II. OCCURRENCE 
Given Congress’s substantial and deep-rooted oversight authority, the 
natural next question is: When does Congress use this power? Specifically, 
when will Congress’s committees engage in oversight? This Part provides 
a theory, grounded in the legislative branch’s internal structure, to explain 
why committees convene oversight hearings regarding certain agency 
actions and ignore others. This theory generates three hypotheses, all of 
which relate to the concept that the particular preference alignment of the 
relevant political actors affects whether oversight occurs concerning the 
given agency action.77 To test the theory, this Part introduces an original 
dataset of over 14,000 agency “infractions,” or potential subjects for 
hearings, and examines which of these infractions cause congressional 
overseers to act and which do not.  
A. Theory 
1. Congress as a Bifurcated Principal 
While committee hearings may have several purposes and be directed at 
multiple audiences, I posit that two audiences within government—the 
agency subject to hearings and the overall legislative branch—often are 
particularly important. Regarding the former audience, committee-based 
oversight serves as a warning to the targeted agency: shape up or face 
																																																						
73.  Id. at 68. 
74.  Id. at 30. 
75.  Id. at 69. 
76.  Id.  
77.  As explained infra, “preference alignment” refers to the relative distance of these actors 
along a unidimensional, liberal-to-conservative scale. 











sanctions.78 Considering the nontrivial time and resource costs associated 
with convening a hearing, doing so provides a costly signal to the agency, 
conveying the committee’s resolve.79 If the agency does not alter its 
behavior to be more consistent with committee preferences, the committee 
could introduce legislation sanctioning the offending agency, and, if that 
legislation passes, the agency could face sizeable negative consequences.80 
Thus, oversight hearings provide powerful inducements to the targeted 
agency based on the legislative branch’s potential response should the 
agency not modify its behavior.81  
Concerning the latter audience, committee hearings provide a signal to 
the overall legislative branch—which may have previously overlooked the 
agency’s issue area—that legislative sanctions may be necessary. Since 
committees possess limited independent power to sanction wayward 
agencies, oversight hearings are consequential largely based on the signal 
that they provide to the larger legislative branch, placing previously 
overlooked issues and agencies on the congressional agenda.82 This agenda-
setting function is not merely a byproduct of holding publicized hearings. 
Rather, committee-based oversight derives its potency from the cue it 
provides to Congress. 
Figure 1 illustrates the basic sequence of agency and committee actions 
relevant to a decision to conduct oversight. First, the committee, when faced 
with an agency infraction, must decide whether or not to hold a hearing. 
Second, if a hearing is held, the agency must decide whether to comply with 
or flout the committee’s wishes following the hearing. Finally, if the agency 
decides not to comply, the committee must decide whether to alert Congress 
to the agency’s intransigence. 
																																																						
78.  See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 111 (2d ed. 1974) 
(“[Legislators] can affect the way legislation is implemented by giving postenactment cues to the 
bureaucracy. Behind the cues lies the threat of future legislation, but in a relation of anticipated responses 
the cues may be sufficient.”). 
79.  See Charles M. Cameron & B. Peter Rosendorff, A Signaling Theory of Congressional 
Oversight, 5 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 44, 44 (1993) (“Hearings signal the resoluteness of the 
committee—the likelihood that the committee will expend the effort to . . . overrul[e] an agency.”). 
80.  Committees also possess means to sanction agencies unilaterally. For instance, a committee 
may decline to report an agency-favored bill or, for Senate committees, a nomination to the floor. While 
the parent chamber may override these decisions by discharging the bill or nomination, the chamber 
incurs costs in doing so. These unilateral sanctions are beyond the scope of this Article and remain a 
promising avenue for future research. 
81.  See Beermann, supra note 11, at 125; Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability 
and Political Review of Agency Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1078 (2001). 
82.  See FOREMAN, supra note 21, at 35 (“[T]he most common impact of congressional scrutiny 
















To provide a bit more detail, when presented with evidence of 
bureaucratic wrongdoing, the committee is faced with a simple decision at 
the first node: hold hearings or ignore the infraction. When making this 
initial decision, the committee considers potential outcomes further down 
the game tree. If the committee chooses to ignore the infraction, the game 




























ends, with the status quo preserved. If the committee holds a hearing, then 
the targeted agency is the next player to move. Following the hearing, the 
agency may either comply with the committee’s demands or ignore them. 
If the agency ignores the committee’s demands, then the committee is 
faced with a second choice. The first option is to punish the agency. There 
are several forms of sanctions, all of which involve Congress’s exercise of 
its “hard powers.”83 For instance, Congress can narrow the scope of the 
agency’s mission; provide a more detailed mandate to constrain the 
agency’s discretion; or, in the Senate, delay or refuse to report out a nominee 
to the agency. All of these sanctions typically originate with a first step 
taken by the House or Senate authorization committee with oversight 
jurisdiction over the agency. (For ease of reference, throughout this Article 
I refer to all of these measures—even those involving budgetary measures 
and appointments—as “legislative sanctions.”) 
Alternatively, the committee, when faced with an intransigent agency, 
may yield. If from the committee’s perspective the potential legislative 
sanctions imposed by Congress would be worse than other options, the 
committee may choose not to act. Put more plainly, the agency calls the 
committee’s bluff. 
Notice that, when deciding whether to hold a hearing, the committee 
must take into account the likely responses of both the agency and Congress. 
Accordingly, preference divergence between Congress and particular 
committees leads committees to behave strategically in deciding which 
agencies (among those agencies within the committees’ jurisdictions) to 
oversee.84 When deciding whether to hold an oversight hearing, a committee 
must weigh the potential gains from curbing agency misbehavior against the 
possibility that a hearing, by highlighting a neglected corner of the executive 
branch, will awaken Congress to enact policy changes that the committee 
opposes.  
Similarly, preference divergence between the committee and agency 
makes oversight less likely, all else equal. To see why, note that committee-
agency preference divergence increases the likelihood that the agency will 
ignore the committee’s demands, thus leaving the committee with the 
choice between acquiescing or alerting the larger legislature—which could 
lead to committee-disfavored legislative action. Because the committee may 
prefer the status quo to either of these outcomes, the committee is less likely 
to engage in oversight in the first instance when the committee and agency 
hold divergent preferences. 
																																																						
83.  For a typology of Congress’s hard and soft powers, see CHAFETZ, supra note 12, at 3. 
84.  Jurisdictional boundaries, though often not precisely fixed, constrain these strategic 













Thus, the insight that committees conduct oversight hearings, which get 
their bite from the threat of Congress-imposed sanctions for continued 
agency non-compliance, has implications concerning when oversight will 
occur. Specifically, the need for committees, when deciding whether to hold 
hearings, to anticipate both the agency’s and Congress’s likely response to 
potential hearings limits the set of issues on which committees decide to 
hold hearings. 
To be clear, this Article does not claim that committees engage in 
oversight exclusively to influence agencies. Legislators may convene 
hearings to raise their profiles with voters, donors, their colleagues, or 
others. Whether hearings also alter agency behavior sometimes may be 
secondary, or even orthogonal, to these objectives. Neither do agencies view 
hearings solely as a means to signal potential legislative changes should the 
agency not bend to the committee. For instance, agency officials may fear 
public admonishment in future hearings and therefore accommodate a 
committee to avoid future embarassment irrespective of any potential for 
legislative sanctions. The Article does assume, however, that the prospect 
of influencing agencies is often in the mix when committees hold hearings; 
in other words, that legislators to some extent care about influencing policy 
and that a substantial source of their ability to exert influence is grounded 
in their legislative power. 
2. Hypotheses 
The above theory leads to three testable hypotheses. The following 
notion motivates all three hypotheses: When deciding whether to hold 
hearings, committees will look down the game tree to weigh the expected 
result of hearings given the relevant actors’ likely behavior at each 
subsequent node against the expected result if the committee declines to 
hold hearings. This logic—essentially, a rudimentary model of coercive 
bargaining—generates the following three hypotheses. 
First, the distance between the political preferences of an agency and 
those of Congress may impact committee oversight activity. When an 
agency and Congress are largely in agreement, the supposed “threat” of 
legislation is less formidable, giving agencies less of an incentive to 
conform to committee objectives following oversight hearings. Aware of 
this heightened risk of non-compliance, committees may have less of an 
incentive to hold hearings under these circumstances. Conversely, agencies 
with preferences that are far from those of Congress may be more likely to 
be overseen. This rationale leads to the following hypothesis. 
 











Hypothesis 1: As agency and congressional preferences diverge, 
committee-based oversight tends to increase. 
 
Second, differences between the agency and committee may affect 
oversight levels. Here, the presence of a bifurcated congressional principal 
leads to an unintuitive prediction. Common sense suggests that a committee 
is more likely to oversee an agency with preferences that are at odds with 
the committee’s views. But the theory presented above points to a different 
result. Consider that, as agency and committee preferences converge, the 
agency may find compliance with committee demands to be less onerous. 
Thus, when faced with a decision to either comply with committee demands 
following a hearing or face the possibility of legislative sanctions, agencies 
may be more likely to comply when their views are closer to those of the 
committee. Committees, aware of this tendency, may be encouraged to 
pursue oversight more vigorously.  
Given the counterintuitive nature of this prediction, I present two 
competing hypotheses; Hypothesis 2a states the “common sense” logic that 
agencies with divergent preferences from those of the relevant committees 
will receive more oversight attention, while Hypothesis 2b presents the 
converse, which is grounded in the theory presented supra. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: As agency and committee preferences diverge, 
committee-based oversight tends to increase. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: As agency and committee preferences converge, 
committee-based oversight tends to increase. 
 
At first blush, Hypothesis 2b may seem surprising. Why would a 
committee be more likely to call attention to infractions committed by 
friendly agencies? Recall that as agency and committee preferences diverge, 
the prospect of complying with the committee following a hearing becomes 
less appealing to the agency—and, thus, the agency is more willing to risk 
legislative sanctions, ceteris paribus. Looking down the decision tree, the 
committee recognizes that oversight hearings are less likely to yield agency 
compliance where agency and committee preferences diverge. Accordingly, 
the committee is less interested in holding oversight hearings in the first 
instance. The basic rationale—which is familiar in the international 
relations literature on economic sanctions—is that coercion is more likely 
to be effective when the coercing actor and its target already have relatively 
close preferences, because the target can more easily meet the sender’s 













Third, I hypothetize that preference convergence between committee and 
Congress is associated with increased oversight. Consider that as a 
hypothetical sanctioning bill moves from committee markup to floor vote, 
the signal that the originating committee had intended to send may be 
distorted; this distortion is especially likely where the committee and 
chamber are at loggerheads.86 The possibility that the enacted version of a 
sanctioning bill may deviate significantly from committee intentions 
suggests that oversight may not occur when committee and Congress hold 
markedly different preferences.87 Under these circumstances, the sanctions 
threat that is necessary for oversight to have an effect may not be plausible.88  
Essentially, if the committee and legislature have opposing views, the 
committee cannot credibly commit to introduce sanctioning legislation 
should the agency not comply following a hearing since this legislation 
could be altered during post-markup stages, leading to a final product that 
is far removed from committee objectives. Alternatively, the committee 
could worry that a hearing would alert Congress to take up legislation in a 
previously unperturbed policy area, inadvertently providing a cue to 
Congress, which, again, could lead to a legislative product far from 
committee preferences. Aware of these potential outcomes, the committee 
may neglect its oversight function when it and Congress hold disparate 
preferences, i.e., when the committee weakly prefers the status quo to 
Congress’s position in the relevant issue area. By contrast, committees with 
political preferences that are aligned with those of Congress may have 
greater incentive to pursue oversight.  
 
Hypothesis 3: As committee and congressional preferences 





85. See Daniel W. Drezner, Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion, 42 INT’L 
STUD. Q. 709, 719–21 (1998). 
86.  See Terry M. Moe, An Assessment of the Positive Theory of “Congressional Dominance”, 
12 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 475, 488 (1987) (stating that, at the final passage stage, bills “may bear very little 
resemblance to what the subcommittee originally threatened to produce . . . ”). 
87.  See Kathleen Bawn, Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, 
Oversight, and the Committee System, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101, 102–08 (1997) (noting that this 
divergence is not an uncommon occurrence due to the greater relative influence of organized interests 
in committee). 
88.  See Moe, supra note 86, at 488 (“[T]he long-run prospect of a substantially moderated, 
compromise bill is likely to carry little inducement value as a control mechanism.”). 











B. Research Design 
1. Unit of Analysis: Agency Infractions Data 
To examine when a committee will decide to take up an agency action 
as the subject of an oversight hearing, it is not sufficient simply to examine 
the characteristics of agency actions that receive oversight attention; 
instead, one must determine the pool of agency actions that potentially could 
lead to hearings—some of which capture Congress’s attention whereas 
others do not—and probe the relevant differences between the two groups 
that led Congress to focus its attention on the former set of agency actions 
but not the latter. 
Accordingly, I constructed an original dataset of agency infractions, 
defined as any perceived agency action during the 1991–2012 period that 
potentially could result in a hearing.89 I derived these data from inspectors 
general (IG) semiannual reports, Government Accountibility Office (GAO) 
annual “top management challenges” lists, and New York Times and Wall 
Street Journal editorials. For each action, I employed a mix of hand-coding 
by a research assistant and automatic text analysis techniques90 to identify 
both the relevant agency and the subject matter of the infraction from a list 
of forty-two subjects.91 
																																																						
89.  This period covers Congresses with a variety of partisan alignments and changes in 
presidential and congressional leadership, thereby militating against the possibility of party-alignment- 
or officeholder-driven results for the analysis to follow. Democrats and Republicans each held the 
presidency and majorities in both chambers for approximately four years during this period. 
(Republicans controlled all three entities for additional seven non-consecutive months in 2001–2002 due 
to several unusual events in a closely divided Senate.) Of the eight possible permutations of Democratic 
or Republican control of the White House, Senate, and House, six occurred during this period. 
90.  For the IG reports, I first ran a Perl script to extract text from PDF versions of each report. I 
then ran a script to identify, within each report, text that is suggestive of an infraction. This script 
identified text containing the agency name and, in close proximity, one of the subject areas listed in note 
91, and automatically assigned an agency code and a subject-matter code to each infraction. A research 
assistant then reviewed these automated assignments. For the newspaper editorials, a research assistant 
and I searched the New York Times and Wall Street Journal online archives for mentions of each agency 
on each newspaper’s editorial page. One of us then read each editorial that mentioned an agency to 
determine, first, whether the editorial criticized the agency and, if so, how to hand-code the editorial 
concerning the agency code and subject-matter code. For the annual GAO Top Management Challenges 
lists, I hand-coded each item on each list.  
91.  These subject areas are: (1) financial management / qualified audit; (2) Government 
Performance & Results Act implementation; (3) program evaluation; (4) information-resource 
management; (5) information-technology issues, e.g., Clinger-Cohen Act implementation, the Y2K bug, 
and IT procurement; (6) Paperwork Reduction Act implementation; (7) Freedom of Information Act 
implementation and related issues concerning secrecy; (8) intergovernmental relations; (9) facilities, 
public-land, and construction management; (10) public land management; (11) procurement, 
acquisitions, and non-construction contractor management; (12) rule or proposed rule with no statutory 
basis; (13) grants to state or local governments; (14) grants to foreign governments; (15) grants for 












These four sources capture a broad range of issues that plausibly could 
lead to hearings. Inspector-general reports cover the widest range of 
subjects. GAO management-challenges lists, which are separate from the 
reports that the agency publishes at Congress’s direction, focus on 
information-technology, procurement, and human resources. The 
newspaper editorials tend to discuss agencies that are allegedly too harsh or 
too lenient with regulated groups or client groups, as well as critiques of 
appointees’ alleged misconduct or incompetence. Figure 2 provides an 
overview of the distribution of these 14,431 across the four sources. 
 








foreign spending to individuals, universities, NGOs, foreign governments, and transnational bodies; (17) 
other grant management issues; agency is (18) insufficiently or (19) overly attentive to client group; (20) 
agency unable to prevent client group misbehavior; agency is (21) too harsh or (22) too lenient to 
regulated group; (23) agency unable to prevent regulated group misbehavior; (24) agency tolerates 
discrimination against its employees; agency tolerates discrimination against contractors, clients, 
regulated groups, or others; (25) violence or threatened violence by agency personnel; (26) safeguarding 
privacy or trade secrets; (27) other civil rights or civil liberties violations; (28) recruiting qualified civil 
servants; (29) training civil servants; (30) incompetent civil servants; (31) politically motivated civil 
servants; (32) bribery of civil servants; (33) fraud, theft of government property, or improper billing by 
civil servants; (34) other misconduct by civil servants; (35) incompetent or unqualified appointee; 
appointee unwilling to implement (36) congressional, (37) presidential or secretarial, or (38) judicial 
directive; (39) attorney general unwilling to appoint special prosecutor; (40) fraud, theft of government 
property, or improper billing by appointee; (41) conflict of interest, or appearance thereof, caused by 
appointee’s ties; and (42) other misconduct by appointee. 











At first glance, compiling data on possible topics for oversight may 
appear to be an exercise in futility. After all, on one level any criticism—no 
matter which person or entity gives voice to it—about any aspect of the 
executive branch can be considered a potential oversight topic. On the other 
side, using overly narrow criteria for determining which critiques have a 
“reasonable” chance of being covered in hearings may raise endogeneity 
concerns. 
There are three reasons why this project avoids these pitfalls. First, the 
four included sources capture the overwhelming majority—over 90%—of 
topics that actually appear on Congress’s oversight agenda. The fact that the 
vast majority of hearings can be traced to a specific infraction in the dataset 
provides compelling support for the measure’s content validity. Second, 
legislator and staff surveys suggest that overseers actually rely on these four 
sources when setting their oversight agendas.92 Third, for those infractions 
identified in IG reports, which account for 11,970 of the 14,431 infractions 
in the dataset, endogeneity concerns—specifically, the possibility of 
congressional influence in the subjects chosen—are not present, since these 
offices are considered removed from congressional influence.93 
I do not claim that legislators consult these particular four sources in 
selecting potential topics. Rather, these four sources do a remarkably good 
job of mirroring the content of the unknown sources—media, government 
offices, colleagues, supporters, etc.—that actually influence legislators’ 
oversight decisions. Taken together, these four sources encompass the range 
of administrative issues that tend to attract Congress’s attention.94 
Neither do I suggest that legislators, in selecting topics for hearings, are 
motivated primarily by an intention to actually “correct” agency behavior. 
Instead, this Part expressly assumes that congressional oversight is 
politically motivated. But recognition of the politicized nature of oversight 
does not imply that the subjects of hearings are made up out of whole cloth. 
Rather, there almost always is some actual “misbehavior” that grounds 
																																																						
92.  See ABERBACH, supra note 20, at 89. 
93.  See PAUL LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH 
FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 3–24 (1993). 
94.  The IG and GAO reports emphasize apolitical valence issues, e.g., procurement 
management, employee retention, etc., while the two newpaper editorial pages often voice ideologically-
driven critiques. In addition, while all four sources address program implementation issues, GAO reports 
on program implementation tend to cut across agencies, e.g., the executive branch is slow to implement 
statutory provisions related to information technology. Also note that, unlike with most GAO reports, 
which are compiled at legislators’ request, these “top management challenges” lists are compiled on 
GAO’s own initiative. Moreover, although both the IG reports and the newspaper editorials frequently 
feature corruption allegations, the Times and Journal tend to focus on behavior by senior appointees, 
while the IGs deal with civil servants and, occasionally, lower-level appointees. Approximately 80% of 
the infractions included in these data are derived from the IG reports, 9% from each of the newspapers, 












congressional oversight. While that real-world agency action may be mere 
pretense, misrepresented or exaggerated for oversight-as-political theater, it 
is typically still present. Further, for those hearings topics that arguably are 
manufactured, the New York Times and Wall Street Journal editorial pages 
may capture many of these subjects. In fact, of the 5,202 unique oversight 
hearings that House committees and subcommittees held between 1991 and 
2012, the subjects of 4,801 were cited in at least one of the four sources 
during the preceding twelve months—a 7.7% omission rate. While I do not 
take a position regarding the actual sources that politically motivated 
legislators use to select subjects for hearings, this low incorrect 
classification rate indicates that, regardless of the actual process by which 
oversight topics are generated, these four sources generally are reflective of 
the actual pool of potential hearings. 
Employing individual infractions as the unit of analysis represents an 
improvement over past work on oversight, which relies on each hearing as 
the unit of analysis.95 Including each infraction—regardless of whether it 
results in a hearing—as an observation in this dataset allows for variation in 
the dependent value. Since virtually all oversight hearings can be traced to 
a specific motivating agency action or event, an analysis of oversight 
activity that does not consider the population of possible oversight hearings 
is essentially omitting the most proximate and arguably the most likely 
cause for a given topic to be placed on the oversight agenda.96  
It is important to acknowledge that considerable variation among 
infractions—each of which has unique characteristics—is stripped away in 
the course of placing each infraction into one of the forty-two subject-matter 
categories listed in Footnote 91. To be sure, similar loss of detail occurs in 
many instances when qualitative information is standardized as data;97 with 
the creation of a new dataset in this Article, the reader sees how the sausage 
is made.  
From the other direction, one also could say that the data are 
insufficiently standardized.For instance, the charge that the Mine Safety & 
Health Administration is insufficiently attentive to investigating fatal 
																																																						
95.  See, e.g., David C.W. Parker & Matthew M. Dull, Divided We Quarrel: The Politics of 
Congressional Investigations, 1947–2004, 34 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 319 (2009); DAVID R. MAYHEW, 
DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946–90 (1991); 
ABERBACH, supra note 20, at 132; MORRIS S. OGUL, CONGRESS OVERSEES THE BUREAUCRACY (1976). 
96.  Moreover, a study seeking to determine what factors explain the occurrence of oversight 
hearings that only examines those instances where oversight hearings occur is selecting on the dependent 
variable, leading to potentially biased estimates.  
97.  See, e.g., ADAM J. BERINSKY, SILENT VOICES: PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA (2006) (investigating the views of survey respondents who say they “don’t 
know” in response to a survey question); Stephen R.G. Jones & W. Craig Riddell, The Measurement of 
Unemployment: An Empirical Approach, 67 ECONOMETRICA 147 (1999) (discussing shortcomings in 
the collection and interpretation of unemployment statistics). 











accidents (subject-matter category 22) is obviously qualitatively different 
from an allegation of waste, fraud, or abuse in National Parks Service 
construction projects (category 9). Most significantly, the former charge has 
a political dimension, as the appropriate level of regulation is a subject of 
political contestation, whereas the latter charge has lower political salience. 
Further, the line between political and non-political “good government” 
issues is often blurry. For instance, conservatives generally may care more 
about Type I errors by agencies (e.g., a computer glitch that leads to the 
approval of applicants that do not meet the standards for the Social Security 
disability program) and liberals more about Type II errors (such as a glitch 
with the opposite effect). 
To address this critique, I run the analyses to follow twice: once for all 
forty-two categories of infractions and again for the subset of infractions 
with the clearest connection to partisan contestation. This subset includes 
agency rulemakings (category 12 in Footnote 91); grant decisions (13–17); 
solicitousness towards client groups (18–20); solicitousness towards 
regulated groups (21–23); appointee competence or responsiveness (35–
39); and criminal or unethical behavior by an appointee (40–42). The results 
of this second set of analyses are reported throughout Parts II and III. 
2. Dependent Variable: Oversight Hearings Data 
For each infraction, I determine whether an oversight hearing was held 
in the twelve months following the first mention of the infraction. I define 
“oversight” broadly, as inquiries into agency practices in which the agency 
undertakes autonomous action or otherwise exercises discretion in a manner 
of which members of Congress may disapprove. Common subjects of 
oversight hearings include agency-generated rules and proposed rules; 
adjudicatory decisions; allegations of waste, fraud, or abuse; non-statutorily 
mandated features of the executive branch’s structure; and many 
procurement and personnel practices. To collect these data, I start with a 
dataset of all hearings held during the relevant period from the Comparative 
Agendas Project (CAP) database, a comprehensive online database of 
congressional activity, among other topics.98 After excluding non-
oversight-related hearings,99 a research assistant or I read the short 
																																																						
98.  FRANK BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN JONES, Congressional Hearings, COMPARATIVE 
AGENDAS PROJECT: U.S. POLICY AGENDAS, www.comparativeagendas.net/us (last visited Feb. 6, 
2018).  
99.  I excluded all hearings that (i) CAP coded as an appropriations hearing, markup, or bill 
referral; (ii) the hearings description, as included in the CAP dataset, included the phased “as required 
by”; (iii) the hearing title or description indicated that the primary purpose of the hearing was to consider 












descriptions of each hearing in the CAP database and classify each hearing 
by the target agency and subject matter, using the same agency and subject-
matter codes as for the infractions data.100 With this procedure, I determine 
that Congress held 5,202 oversight hearings between 1991 and 2012. 
3. Independent Variables: Congressional, Committee, and Agency 
Preferences  
Converting the hypotheses in Section II.A into testable variables 
involves identifying preference estimates for Congress, its committees and 
subcommittees, and executive agencies.  
To determine congressional and subcommittee preferences, I start with 
the DW-NOMINATE dataset, which contains estimates on a 
unidimensional scale of each legislator’s ideological position based on that 
legislator’s roll call voting record.101 I measure congressional preferences 
using preference estimates for the median House majority party member.102 
To measure subcommittee preferences, I then identify the subcommittee 
with the most legitimate jurisdictional claim over each infraction.103 I use 
the preference estimate for the subcommittee chair as a proxy for the 
subcommittee’s preferences, which is proper because most subcommittees 
formally authorize only the chair to call a hearing.104 
																																																						
100.  Where the short description did not provide sufficient information, we accessed the 
Congressional Information Service database to examine hearing testimony and other primary source 
information to determine which agency was the principal subject of each hearing.  
101.  See ROYCE CARROLL ET AL., DW-NOMINATE SCORES WITH BOOTSTRAPPED STANDARD 
ERRORS (2015), http://k7moa.com/dwnomin.htm; see also KEITH POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, 
CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING (1997). All calculations utilize 
first dimension Common Space DW-NOMINATE scores. 
102. A set of alternative specifications uses the median House member as an alternative proxy for 
chamber preferences. The results using this measure were substantially similar to those reported in the 
main model. 
103.  The decision to hold hearings can properly be considered to rest with the subcommittee. For 
Democratic-controlled Congresses during this period, the subcommittee bill of rights granted to 
subcommittees powers that are relevant to a decision to hold hearings. See generally Richard Hall & 
Lawrence Evans, The Power of Subcommittees, 52 J. POL. 335 (1990). During periods of Republican 
rule, when the formal powers previously assigned to subcommittees were rolled back, subcommittees 
still retained their authority in many oversight-related areas, through norms and other informal 
mechanisms. See generally John Baughman, The Role of Subcommittees After the Republican 
Revolution, 34 AM. POL. RES. 243 (2006). Because the House and Senate rules do not delineate 
subcommittees’ jurisdictions, these determinations necessarily were, in essence, judgment calls. For 
each infraction, I identify the relevant subcommittee for each infraction by examining subcommittee 
names and, where possible, descriptions of the subcommittee turf on the subcommittee’s website.  
104. KAISER, OLESZEK & TATELMAN, supra note 24, at 69. As an alternative specification for 
subcommittee preferences, I also used preference estimates for that group’s median majority party 
member. As discussed in Section I.C, many subcommittees by convention permit a subset of 
subcommittee members—typically a majority of the majority-party members—to call a hearing. Id. The 
minority party, by contrast, essentially plays no role in the scheduling of oversight hearings. See MARTIN 











To ascertain agency preferences, I employ Chen-Johnson scores.105 
These authors use bureaucrats’ campaign contributions to elected officials 
to estimate agencies’ ideological views. They then input the roll-call-based 
preference estimate for the elected official back to the donor, using a 
weighted average to determine the preferences of individuals that donate to 
multiple politicians.106 
Finally, to construct Agency-Chamber Divergence, I normalize the 
Chen-Johnson and DW-NOMINATE scores for, respectively, agencies and 
the House and Senate, on a zero to one scale. I then calculate the absolute 
value of the distance between these two scores for each agency-chamber 
dyad. I employ a similar procedure to create Agency-Comm. Convergence 
and Comm.-Chamber Convergence.107 
C. Results 
With a pool of 14,431 agency infractions as the unit of analysis; 5,202 
oversight hearings as the dependent variable; and political preference 
estimates for Congress, its committees, and all executive and most 
independent agencies as independent variables, I run a series of logistic 
regression models to test the hypotheses listed in Section II.A. To provide a 
substantive interpretation of the coefficient estimates, I then simulate first 
differences.  
Table 1 reports the results of these models. The first column shows the 
theorized directions of the relevant coefficients, based on the hypotheses 
developed above. Model 1 reports the results of a series of bivariate models 
using all infractions as observations. Model 2 reports the results of a 
multivariate model using these same data. Models 3 and 4 report these 
results only for infractions in the most politically salient categories.108 For 
																																																						
JAMES, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 48 (2002). In light of the role that a majority of the majority party 
plays, this median provides a second way to operationalization subcommittee preferences. The results 
in Parts II and III using this alternative specification are substantially similar. 
105. Jowei Chen & Tim Johnson, Federal Employee Unionization and Presidential Control of the 
Bureaucracy: Estimating and Explaining Ideological Change in Executive Agencies, 27 J. THEORETICAL 
POL. 151 (2014) (dataset available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jowei/AgencyIdeology/).  
106.  A set of alternative specifications uses agency-ideology scores derived from a survey of 
prominent administrative scholars and journalists, polling each respondent on his or her opinion of 
various agencies’ ideological outlooks. See Joshua D. Clinton & David E. Lewis, Expert Opinion, 
Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences, 16 POL. ANALYSIS 3, 11 (2008). The results using this 
measure of agency ideology were substantially similar to those reported in the main model. 
107. Because these quantities are easier to interpret as becoming larger as the relevant actors’ 
preferences converge rather than diverge, Agency-Comm. Convergence and Comm.-Chamber 
Convergence use the inverses of the absolute values of the distances between, respectively, agency and 
committee and committee and chamber. 












all models, the coefficient estimates show the association between features 
of the congressional-committee-agency environment and the likelihood of 
a committee convening at least one oversight hearing concerning that 
infraction. 
 
Table 1: Regression Results 
 














































































 N Y N Y 
observations  14,431 14,431 2,070 2,070 
Cells report coefficient estimates and, in parentheses, standard errors clustered by 
committee. Unit of analysis: agency infractions. Dependent variable: whether at 
least one hearing was held concerning the infraction in the 12 months following 
the infraction’s mention. Models 1 and 3 include fixed effects for each Congress 
between the 103rd and 112th (baseline category: 102nd Congress). *** signifies p 




rulemakings (category 12 in Footnote 91); grant decisions (categories 13–17); solicitousness towards 
client groups (18–20); solicitousness towards regulated groups (21–23); appointee competence or 
responsiveness (35–39); and criminal or unethical behavior by an appointee (40–42). 











The hypotheses related to Agency-Chamber Divergence and Comm.-
Chamber Convergence generally find support in Table 1. All of the 
associated coefficient estimates are positively signed and, with the 
exception of Agency-Chamber Divergence in Model 4, statistically 
significant. The story is more mixed for Agency-Comm. Convergence. 
While the coefficient estimates are positive in all four models, they only 
reach conventionally accepted levels of statistical significance in Model 2, 
which is the full, multivariate model. In Models 1 and 3, the associated 
standard errors dwarf the coefficient estimates. 
The substantive interpretation of these estimates is not intuitive. Figure 
3 reports the expected change in the likelihood of a committee convening at 
least one oversight hearing concerning an infraction when each covariate, 
in turn, shifts from its twenty-fifth percentile value to its seventy-fifth 
percentile value. For instance, the value for the Committee-Chamber 
Convergence variable indicates that oversight hearings are 10.6% more 
likely to occur in expectation when Committee-Chamber Convergence is at 
its seventy-fifth percentile value—i.e., when the preferences of the relevant 
committee and its parent chamber are closer together than is the case for 
seventy-fifth of the observations in the dataset—than when this variable is 
at its twenty-fifth percentile value. 
These simulated first differences are generated from Model 2, the full 
model. Analyses grounded in the other models yield similar results for 
Agency-Chamber Divergence and Comm.-Chamber Convergence and null 












Figure 3: First Differences in the Expected Likelihood of Oversight 
 
 
n = 14,431. Figure reports simulated first differences in the expected 
likelihood of a committee convening at least one oversight hearing 
concerning an infraction, when one shifts each explanatory variable, in 
turn, from its twenty-fifth to its seventy-fifth percentile value. Bars 
signify 95% confidence interval. Quantities of interest estimated by 
running 1000 simulations in Zelig using a logistic regression model. See 
Christine Choirat, James Honaker, Kosuke Imai, Gary King, & Olivia 
Lau, Zelig: Everyone's Statistical Software (2015 ed.), 
www.zeligproject.org (last visited Jan 24, 2017). Unit of analysis: agency 
infractions. Dependent variable: whether at least one hearing was held 
concerning the infraction in the 12 months following the infraction’s 
mention. 
 
These results show that political differences among the various actors—
agencies, committees, and Congress—substantively affect which problems 
within administrative agencies become topics for oversight hearings.109 The 
reason why committees must take other actors’ preferences into account 
																																																						
109.  I also run similar simulated first differences for the 2070 infractions in the most politically 
salient categories. See supra Section II.B (listing these most politically salient infractions). The resulting 
coefficient estimates are all properly signed and larger than the associated clustered standard errors, 
although only Comm-Chamber Convergence achieves conventionally accepted levels of statistical 






























when deciding whether to conduct oversight is rooted in what this Article 
terms “the oversight dilemma”: the impact of hearings requires the potential 
for sanctions following an agency’s non-compliance with committee 
objectives expressed in a hearing, but committees do not possess any 
independent authority to impose these measures. Since oversight involves a 
bifurcated principal, it is consequential only to the extent that an implied 
threat of congressional sanctions following non-compliance with committee 
objectives is credible.110 As a result, committees limit their oversight 
activity based on factors in the larger political environment—but, when 
committee oversight does occur, it is aligned with the more democratically 
representative preferences of the overall Congress.  
III. IMPACT 
Determining whether oversight alters agency behavior or is merely 
reelection-oriented posturing is essential to assessing whether oversight can 
serve as an ex post check on delegated powers. Given Congress’s broad 
delegations of ex ante policymaking authority to the executive branch,111 
the relative weakness or underuse of other ex post means of influence,112 
and the judiciary’s broad endorsement of the transfer of policymaking 
authority to the executive branch,113 a firm understanding of the 
consequences of ex post oversight is crucial to assessing the extent to which 
Congress exercises control over the administrative state. 
The notion that oversight affords Congress some degree of control over 
administration is in tension with the conventional wisdom. The dominant 
perspective among legal scholars regarding the relative abilities of the 
political branches to control the administrative state considers Congress in 
decline and the White House ascendant.114 This perspective holds that, at 
																																																						
110.  Recall that this logic motivated the development of Hypotheses 1–3. See supra Section II.A. 
111.  See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency 
Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 434–38 (1999). 
112.  See Jack M. Beermann, The Turn Toward Congress in Administrative Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 
727, 731 (2009) [hereinafter Beermann, The Turn Toward Congress].  
113.  See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (noting that only a bare-
bones “intelligible principle,” such as that the regulation is in the “public interest,” is needed to satisfy 
the nondelegation doctrine). The Court also grants agencies wide latitude in interpreting their organic 
statutes and self-promulgated regulations, and in determining the appropriate administrative procedures 
to govern their decision-making. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc. 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978). Relatedly, courts exhibit an overall disinclination to 
interfere where Congress has not unambiguously expressed its intent via ex ante lawmaking. See 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842; Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678–79 (1981); Youngstown Sheet 
and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 












least since the New Deal era, Congress has demonstrated a willingness to 
cede policymaking power to the executive branch via the enactment of 
broadly-written and, in some cases, deliberately vague statutes that place 
few limits on administrative agencies.115 The judiciary mostly has assented 
to this transfer of policymaking authority,116 with the Supreme Court 
upholding every statute challenged on nondelegation grounds that it has 
considered since 1935.117 Further, the design of administrative procedures 
has proven inadequate as an alternative means of congressional control. 
Although administrative procedures—in theory—could be designed to 
faciliate popular or interest group influence in the adminstrative state, 
thereby obviating the need for continued, direct congressional 
involvement,118 Congress does not devote much attention to this function.119  
The received wisdom among legal scholars also focuses on the White 
House’s development of a set of tools to enhance presidential control of 
administration—a development that occurred concurrent to the decline in 
Congress’s exercise of its lawmaking authority.120 Most notably, the use of 
executive orders to set administrative policy has become increasingly 
common since the New Deal era.121 The establishment of the White House 
Office of Management & Budget in the 1970s122 and the expanded role that 
																																																						
115.  See Seidenfeld, supra note 111. 
116.  See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. at 474 (requiring only that Congress provide an 
“intelligible principle” to guide executive branch policymakers). 
117.  See Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, 103 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1012 (2015). 
118.  See Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, & Barry Weingast, Administrative Procedures as 
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987) [hereinafter McNollgast, Procedures 
as Instruments]; accord Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 
(1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 555–57, 706 (requiring a notice and comment period 
before most agency rulemakings, mandating trial-like features in certain agency adjudications, and 
requiring that substantial evidence support agency adjudicatory findings).  
119.  See Glen O. Robinson, Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies: 
Political Uses of Structure and Process, 75 VA. L. REV. 483, 488 (1989) (noting that an overview of a 
variety of agencies’ organic statutes “reveals no relevant specification of internal structure.”); id. at 488–
89 (arguing that this inter-agency procedural uniformity suggests that Congress does not vary 
administrative procedures for the purpose of promoting agency responsiveness to favored groups, which 
calls into question the notion that the APA enables a form of indirect congressional influence in 
administration). Perhaps as a result, the formal ability of outside actors to challenge administrative 
proceedings or outcomes is limited. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (the challenger bears 
the burden of demonstrating actual bias in proceedings in which the same agency serves as investigator 
and adjudicator); Envirocare of Utah v. NRC, 194 F.3d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Chevron deference permits 
agencies to exclude certain parties from adjudications). 
120.  See Thomas O. Sargentich, The Contemporary Assault on Checks and Balances, 7 WIDENER 
J. PUB. L. 231, 247–55 (1998). 
121.  See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 133 (1999). 
122.  Although OMB’s origins are in the 1920s Bureau of the Budget, the office’s reorganization 
in the 1970s significantly expanded its powers and strengthened its ties to the White House. See Elena 
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2275–76 (2001). 











its Office of Information & Regulatory Affairs subunit has played since the 
1980s and 1990s, rejecting proposed regulations that failed its cost-benefit 
analyses, further bolstered presidential control of administration.123 More 
recently, the increased use of presidential signing statements as post-
passage instruments of White House policy also augments presidential 
power.124 Mostly unchallenged by the courts,125 these mechanisms reinforce 
the perception that the President occupies the central position in the 
administrative state.126 By contrast, many of the functional innovations 
proposed by Congress to buttress its role in administration have been struck 
down on formalist, separation-of-powers grounds.127 
On the surface, trends in the use of these three formal control 
mechanisms—i.e., Congress’s reduced role in lawmaking and concomitant 
delegation of policymaking authority to administrative agencies; its 
inability to design administrative procedures as an alternative means of 
indirect control; and the White House’s establishment of new mechanisms 
to enhance its involvement in administration—suggest that Congress is a 
branch in decline.128 Yet emphasis on these formal, directly coercive 
mechanisms neglects other potential means of congressional influence.129 
Consider that Congress began to pursue its oversight function with renewed 
vigor during roughly the same period as its relative role in policymaking 
declined. For instance, Congress passed its two arguably most consequential 
oversight-related bills—the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the 
Legislative Reorganization Act (LRA)—in 1946,130 directly following a 
																																																						
123.  See id. at 2277–81, 2285–90. 
124.  See Ronald A. Cass & Peter L. Strauss, The Presidential Signing Statements Controversy, 
16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 11, 15 (2007). 
125.  See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1981). But see Clinton v. City 
of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (holding the presidential line item veto unconstitutional).  
126.  See generally Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1728 
(1996). 
127.  See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 
252 (1991) (blocking legislators from serving on an administrative board); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 
714 (1986) (striking down a statute that placed some budgetary authority in the hands of an executive 
official removable only by Congress); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (disallowing the one-
chamber legislative veto). U.S. Senate v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (1982), aff’d, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983) 
(holding the two-chamber veto unconstitutional); Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy 
Council, 673 F.2d 425 (1982), aff’d, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983) (striking down a one-chamber veto of 
administrative rules); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (preventing congressional leaders from 
unilaterally selecting members of an independent agency). 
128.  See SEAN GAILMARD & JOHN W. PATTY, LEARNING WHILE GOVERNING: EXPERTISE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 168 (2013); ACKERMAN, supra note 14. 
129.  See Beermann, supra note 11, at 64–65; Chafetz, supra note 11, at 724. 
130.  The APA provided mechanisms by which interest groups could activate “fire alarms” to alert 
Congress of disfavored administrative action. See Mathew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, 
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 173 












period of massive presidential aggrandizement during the New Deal and 
World War II.131 Equally noteworthy is the fact that the 1970s and 1980s 
saw the concurrent development of new mechanisms for presidential control 
of administration and increased congressional attention to oversight.132 
Perhaps Congress’s heightened attention to oversight constituted an attempt 
to reassert control over powers that had shifted to the executive branch.133 
A. Theory 
1. Congressional Abdication versus Congressional Dominance 
I claim that, in an era of greater executive involvement in administration, 
Congress uses oversight hearings to retain some degree of control over 
delegated powers. Political scientists have long debated whether Congress-
agency relationships are characterized by congressional abdication or 
congressional dominance. Grounded in capture theory, the abdication 
perspective holds that because committees, agencies, and interest groups 
tend to have close ties, the prospects for vigorous committee oversight of 
agencies are slim.134 That reelection-focused legislators supposedly have 
little incentive to conduct the hard work of day-to-day oversight (beyond 
headline-grabbing, high-profile probes) further supports the abdication 
perspective.135 Thus, the provision of oversight constitutes a collective 
action problem, with reelection-oriented legislators being poorly 
incentivized for its production. 
A second set of scholars, by contrast, considers Congress to dominate 
agencies.136 According to congressional dominance theory, the fact that 
																																																						
Beermann, supra note 11, at 122. 
131.  See generally ERIC SCHICKLER, DISJOINTED PLURALISM: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION AND 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. CONGRESS (2001). 
132.  See Kagan, supra note 122, at 2277–81, 2285–90 (describing the strengthening of the White 
House-directed OMB and OIRA during the 1980s); ABERBACH, supra note 20, at 34–37 (noting a 
marked increase in oversight activity during the 1970s and 1980s).  
133.  Cf. Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through the New Presidentialism, 22 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 227, 235 (1998) (stating that greater presidential involvement, “[by] raising the stakes 
for other actors in the system, . . . may trigger an oversight arms race.”). 
134.  See LAWRENCE C. DODD & RICHARD L. SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
STATE (1979); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED 
STATES (1979); Seymour Scher, Conditions for Legislative Control, 25 J. POL. 526, 533–34 (1963). 
135.  See WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT 
PRESIDENTIAL ACTION (2003); Terry M. Moe, The Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The Presidential 
Advantage, in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 425 (Michael Nelson, ed., 2003). 
136.  See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, 
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 
431 (1989) [hereinafter McNollgast, Structure and Process]; McNollgast, Procedures as Instruments, 
supra note 118; McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 130. 











committees are privileged actors in the legislative process empowers them 
to take on recalcitrant agencies.137 Committee prerogatives during the 
budget and reauthorization processes enable committees to control the 
agencies within their jurisdictions.138 
Committees’ ability to oversee and direct agencies does not imply, 
however, that committees actually engage in oversight, much less that this 
oversight is consequential. Rather, congressional dominance theory 
contends that legislators design bureaucratic institutions to respond to their 
preferences, through the enactment of information-forcing provisions and 
via committees’ involvement in appointments.139 In effect, according to 
dominance theory, committees substitute ex ante means of control in place 
of ex post oversight. Rather than engaging in active, continual monitoring 
of agencies (“police patrols,” in the theory’s parlance), committees are 
mobilized to act only when an outside group, e.g., an interest group aligned 
with the committee, sounds a “fire alarm” to notify the committee that 
something is amiss.140 
Abdication theory points to infrequent hearings as indicating that 
Congress is shirking; dominance theory posits that infrequent hearings are 
a consequence of well-crafted administrative procedures and interest-group 
monitoring that reduce the need for congressional involvement.141 Missing 
from both theories is any evidence regarding whether oversight hearings—
when they occur—are consequential. If even infrequent hearings 
significantly impact agency behavior, that hypothetical finding would 
undercut the abdication perspective. Conversely, if hearings do not have an 
impact, that finding would weaken the dominance perspective, which 
implies that, when a fire alarm is pulled, that alarm should lead to changed 
agency behavior. Yet, despite the role that oversight plays in both theories, 
little is known about how consequential oversight activity actually is.142 
																																																						
137.  See Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional 
Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983); see 
also KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 97 (1991) (regarding 
committee perquisites in the lawmaking process). 
138.  See id. 
139.  See Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins & Barry R. Weingast, A Theory of Political 
Control and Agency Discretion, 33 M. J. POL. SCI. 588, 598, 604 (1989). 
140.  McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 130, at 165–75. 
141.  See McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 136, at 443; McNollgast, Procedures as 
Instruments, supra note 118, at 244. 
142. Although there is no shortage of claims regarding the effects of oversight, these claims in large 
part have not been tested globally, viz. beyond discrete case studies of particular agencies or issue areas. 
Political science offers few empirically-grounded insights into the impact of oversight on administrative 
outcomes, as scholars have not empirically analyzed the consequences of oversight in a systemic 
manner. Instead, scholarship on oversight can be grouped into three categories. First, scholars have 












2. Assessing the Abdication and Dominance Perspectives 
The infractions data introduced in Part II can fill this gap. If specific 
infractions are found to be less likely to recur following a hearing—relative 
to their rate of recurrence when no hearing is held—this would suggest that 
executive branch officials take oversight seriously. By contrast, a null 
finding would suggest that oversight hearings are toothless—that, while 
hearings may serve members’ electoral needs, they do not affect policy 
outcomes. This Part tests the hypothesis that oversight hearings reduce 
recidivism; in other words, that infractions that are the subject of oversight 
hearings are less likely to recur than are similar infractions that do not 
appear on Congress’s oversight agenda.  
The basic notion to be tested here is simple: that oversight matters. 
Congress marshals substantial resources to perform its oversight function, 
from the time that legislators spend preparing for and conducting hearings 
on often technical subjects to the engagement in these efforts of hundreds 
of committee staff members—and thousands more at the Government 
Accountability Office, Congressional Research Service, and other 
legislative support agencies.143 Further, separate from committee staff, 
legislators’ personal staff members often devote extensive time to oversight 
functions, including preparing their political principals for hearings.144 
Yet much of this activity, including most of the hundreds of hearings 
held each year, does not make headlines. So why do legislators devote these 
resources to oversight, incurring opportunity costs for the use of their time 
and salary space in their staff budgets? Simply put, this Article posits that 
legislators expend resources on oversight because oversight can get results.  
																																																						
ABERBACH, supra note 20. Second, positive political theorists have presented theories of the conditions 
for or consequences of oversight. See, e.g., Murray Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary, 
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 499 (1989); 
McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 130; Moe, supra note 85. Third, case studies examine the 
consequences of oversight with respect to a limited number of specific agencies, congressional 
committees, or policy areas. See, e.g., Mary K. Olson, Agency Rulemaking, Political Influences, 
Regulation, and Industry Compliance, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 573 (1999) (studying the FDA); Jeffrey C. 
Talbert, Bryan D. Jones, & Frank R. Baumgartner, Nonlegislative Hearings and Policy Change in 
Congress, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 383 (1995) (drug abuse and three other issues); JOEL A. MINTZ, 
ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES (1995) (environmental policy); R. 
DOUGLAS ARNOLD, CONGRESS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: A THEORY OF INFLUENCE (1979) (military 
basing, public works projects and social services grants). 
143.  See WILLIAM WEST, CONTROLLING THE BUREAUCRACY 131–32 (1995); RICHARD HALL, 
PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESS 138 (1996). 
144. See ABERBACH, supra note 20, at 55. That legislators often utilize their personal staff for 
committee oversight constitutes a revealed preference. Because members of Congress receive a single 
lump sum for all personal staff compensation, every dollar spent on oversight work, including preparing 
for hearings, that personal staff members conduct is one less dollar that can be used, e.g., for constituent 
service. See IDA A. BRUDNICK, CRS REP. FOR CONGRESS, R40962, MEMBERS’ REPRESENTATIONAL 
ALLOWANCE: HISTORY AND USAGE 10–11 (2015).  











I am agnostic regarding the specific causal mechanism by which hearings 
alter agency behavior. Although I presume, based on Part II, that oversight 
derives much of its power from an implicit threat of legislative sanctions 
should the agency not comply with committee demands following a hearing, 
the analysis in this Part does not rely on this assumption. Perhaps the 
embarrassment of being publicly criticized is enough to motivate 
reputation-valuing agency officials to change. Or perhaps lower-level 
agency officials angling for a promotion alert Congress to infractions 
(bypassing the media), and when they are promoted, they implement 
changes; in this telling, oversight motivates a personnel change, and this 
personnel change, in turn, leads to new practices at the agency.  
B. Research Design 
1. Foundations 
Each agency action that is a plausible candidate for congressional 
attention varies on two dimensions: congressional attention and recurrence. 
This variance allows for evaluation of the consequences of oversight 
hearings, by comparing the recurrence rate of infractions that lead to 
oversight hearings with the recurrence rate for otherwise similar infractions 
that do not. 
Once again, TREAD Act implementation is illustrative. Table 2 
identifies four problems with NHTSA’s implementation of the Act, all of 
which were derived from the DOT Inspector General’s January 2002 
report.145 The table classifies each issue based on whether Congress held a 
hearing and whether the issue persisted. 
 
Table 2: Typology of TREAD Act Implementation Issues 
 
 Hearing Held 
 
No Hearing Held 
 
Issue Resolved  
(1) 
Defect information system 
not created by deadline 
(3) 





Tire pressure warning rule 


















TREAD Act implementation provides examples of all four possible 
situations included in Table 2. First, recall that the Department of 
Transportation’s Inspector General faulted NHTSA for its inaction in 
creating a new defect information system.146 The next month, a House 
oversight panel strongly criticized the agency for this failure.147 NHTSA 
completed the first phase of the system later that year, and the agency’s first 
recall based on the system occurred in 2004.148 Accordingly, this issue is 
placed in Box (1) in Table 2; Congress held a hearing, and the issue was 
resolved. 
Second, NHTSA’s failure to publish in a timely manner a rule requiring 
automakers to install tire pressure warning systems also provoked 
legislators’ ire, but did not change agency behavior. The TREAD Act 
required the agency to complete a rulemaking by November 1, 2001, for a 
regulation requiring “a warning system in new motor vehicles to indicate . . 
. when a tire is significantly under inflated.”149 The Inspector General’s 
January 2002 report criticized the agency for failing to issue a final rule.150 
Legislators seized on this delay—and also faulted the agency for indications 
from the notice-and-comment period that the agency was receptive to 
undercutting the warning-system requirement—during the February 2002 
hearing.151 
On June 5, 2002, NHTSA published a final rule, which, after an 
additional delay, would require select vehicles to include a pressure sensor 
on at least one tire.152 The Second Circuit held that the rule’s allowance for 
automakers to forgo a warning system on all but one tire was contrary to the 
TREAD Act’s unambiguous text per Chevron and arbitrary and capricious 
per State Farm.153 With the rule vacated, the Inspector General’s September 
																																																						
146.  Id. 
147.  The Implementation of the TREAD Act, supra note 7, at 5–6, 28. 
148.  See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 8, at 5; McDonald, supra note 9, at 1177–78. 
149.  Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act of 
2000, Pub. L. No. 106–414, § 13, 114 Stat. 1800, 1806. 
150.  See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 6, at ii–v, 3, 30. 
151.  See The Implementation of the TREAD Act, supra note 7, at 28 (statement of Rep. Cliff 
Stearns, Chair, Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce); id. at 6 (statement of Rep. Ed Bryant); id. at 10 (prepared statement of Rep. Billy Tauzin, 
Chair, H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce); id. at 32 (statement of Rep. Fred Upton); id. at 34 (statement 
of Rep. Bart Gordon). 
152.  49 C.F.R. § 571.138 pt. S4.2 (2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 38704, 38722–23 (June 5, 2002) (final 
rule). Further, the rule would be phased-in gradually over this three-year period; it would not apply to a 
most new vehicles until the second year. 67 Fed. Reg. at 38706, 38708–09, 38722–38; 66 Fed. Reg. at 
38989–95. Finally, the rule did not specify any requirements after a three-year window. Id. at 38722. 
153.  Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Mineta, 340 F.3d 39, 62 (2d Cir. 2003). The court permitted the rule’s 
incremental phase-in period to stand, however. See id. 











2004 report noted that rulemaking was still ongoing—over two and a half 
years after the hearing and almost three years after the statutorily imposed 
deadline.154 Accordingly, this issue is placed in Box (2) in the table; 
although oversight occurred concerning both perceived weaknesses in the 
then-proposed rule and delays in its completion, this oversight was not 
effective. 
Third, the Inspector General’s January 2002 report faulted NHTSA for 
inconsistent decisions concerning whether recalls are warranted, and 
recommended that the agency institute a form of peer review among its 
analysts.155 Legislators did not broach this subject in the February 2002 
hearing or, indeed, in any other hearing. The Inspector General, however, 
raised the subject sua sponte during the February 2002 session—to 
commend the agency for its responsiveness.156 Because this issue was 
resolved without congressional intervention, it appears in Box (3). 
Fourth, the Inspector General’s report criticized NHTSA for cost 
overruns associated with implementing that Act.157 Not only did legislators 
ignore this critique during oversight hearings, but one legislator faulted 
NHTSA for spending too little money on implementation.158 
Unsurprisingly, NHTSA’s failures to contain costs reappeared in the 
Inspector General’s September 2004 report.159 This issue, which Congress 
ignored and which persisted, belongs in Box (4). 
A naïve analysis of the impact of oversight would compare the 
recurrence rates of issues that receive congressional attention with those that 
do not. This strategy, however, ignores the facts that neither the probability 
of selection for oversight hearings nor the likelihood of “correction”—either 
post-oversight or, if no hearings are held, at some future point—is uniform 
across subjects. 
Consider that peer review is likely the most tractable issue included in 
Table 2. Requiring analysts to check each other’s work involves few 
tradeoffs; given that NHTSA employed eight analysts in 2004,160 even 
doubling the staff to conduct peer reviews would not be budget-busting. By 
contrast, Boxes (1) and (2) involve the issuance of highly technical 
regulations for which NHTSA is required to consider costs to automakers 
																																																						
154.  See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 8, at 4, 9–10.  
155.  See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 6, at x, 13–16. 
156.  See The Implementation of the TREAD Act, supra note 7, at 6 (statement of Kenneth M. 
Mead, Inspector General). 
157.     See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 6, at viii–iv, 5–9. 
158.  See The Implementation of the TREAD Act, supra note 7, at 6 (statement of Rep. Dingell). 
159.     See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 8, at 2–7, 10–11, 14. 












when crafting the rules,161 and Box (4)’s imperative to reduce the agency’s 
outlays may place other program goals at risk.  
Because issue areas differ in terms of both their suitability for oversight 
hearings and their tractability, straightforward comparisons across these 
four categories are impractical. Instead, one must compare the recurrence 
rate of issues that are subject to oversight with otherwise similar issues that 
Congress ignores. The remainder of this subpart describes how this 
comparison is made.  
2. Connecting Infractions to Hearings and to Later Infractions 
Part II.B, supra, introduced two new datasets on agency infractions and 
oversight hearings. In this Part, I use these datasets to examine the 
recurrence rate of infractions that are subject to hearings with the recurrence 
rate of otherwise similar infractions that are not. First, I determine whether 
each infraction in the first dataset is connected to a hearing in the second 
dataset. I code each infraction on two dimensions: the targeted agency and 
the specific subject area, e.g., problems with intergovernmental grants, 
under-enforcement concerns, etc.162 I then code each hearing along the same 
two dimensions. Whenever an infraction and hearing are assigned the same 
subject-area and agency code and the hearing occurred within the twelve 
months following the first mention on the infraction, I consider this 
particular infraction to be the subject of that hearing. Finally, for each 
infraction (and regardless of whether a hearing occurred), I determined 
whether an infraction with the same agency and subject-matter codes 
reappeared in the infractions dataset in the 13 to 24 months following the 
initial infraction. Thus, this process identifies, for each infraction, (i) 
whether the infraction led to a hearing and (ii) whether the infraction 
reoccurred.  
3. Method 
To test the hypothesized causal relationship between oversight hearings 
and agency recidivism, one cannot simply compare agency recidivism 
concerning infractions that were and were not subject to hearings, because 
infractions in these two groups likely differ in other ways that may be 
																																																						
161.  See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (requiring notice and comment for substantive rulemakings); 
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (mandating cost-benefit analysis for 
same); U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 8, at 9 (describing the technical nature of the defect 
information system). 
162.  See supra note 91 (listing the forty-two subject areas). 











correlated with recidivism. Neither is conventional regression analysis, with 
a set of variables controlling for these other potential differences in 
infractions, appropriate.163 Accordingly, I use genetic matching, a statistical 
method that allows for the evaluation of causal claims. While it is 
impossible for a given infraction to simultaneously both receive and not 
receive the “treatment” of an oversight hearing, matching provides a 
second-best alternative for causal inference; it allows the analyst to identify 
a control observation that is as similar as possible to a given treated 
observation concerning a set of observable, pre-treatment covariates but for 
the fact that the control observation did not receive the treatment.164  
Genetic matching, specifying one-to-one matching with replacement, is 
the most appropriate matching method for this analysis based on the 
properties of some of the covariates on which it is important to achieve 
balance.165 The genetic matching algorithm identifies a suitable set of 
ignored infractions to compare to the set of infractions that are subject to at 
least one hearing so that the distributions of the two groups will be 
																																																						
163.  Because regression analysis involves the minimization of squared errors, marginal 
observations are heavily weighted. This feature presents a problem where, as here, there are many 
observations in one category that are extremely unlike observations in the other category, and thus 
cannot be “controlled for” with a set of variables. For instance, because it would be absurd to think that 
a Watergate-style event would not lead to at least one hearing, including such an event in a linear 
regression would lead to biased estimates, regardless of the quality and quantity of the control variables 
or the weighting scheme for outlying observations. Matching, by contrast, places emphasis on 
observations that have similar covariates, so that extreme or marginal observations might receive no 
weight at all. 
164. The causal effect of treatment τ on unit i is given by τi = Yi1−Yi0, where Yi1 is the potential 
outcome if i receives treatment and Yi0 is the potential outcome if i does not. Assuming that the process 
by which an observation i is selected into the treatment or control group is determined by Xi (a set of 
observable, pre-treatment covariates), it is possible to estimate the average treatment effect for the 
treated (ATT) as:  
 t  | (T = 1) = E[E(Yi | Xi, Ti = 1)−E(Yi | Xi, Ti = 0)] 
where Ti is a treatment indicator, with a value of 1 if i is in the treatment regime and 0 otherwise. 
As the above equation shows, calculating the ATT for observational data requires pairing treated 
observations with untreated ones in terms of the covariates in X. Matching algorithms do just this: pairing 
each treated unit with a closely-matched control unit. See Jasjeet Sekhon, Opiates for the Matches: 
Matching Methods for Causal Inference, 12 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 487 (2009) (providing an overview of 
matching methods). 
165. Since most of the covariates are discrete, the Equal Percent Bias Reduction (EPBR) property 
does not hold. Because multivariate matching based on Mahalanobis distance, propensity score matching 
via logistic regression, and other affinely invariant matching methods all require that this property be 
met, the fact that some covariates are discrete means that using these methods would result in greater 
bias. Jasjeet Sekhon, Multivariate and Propensity Score Matching Software with Automated Balance 
Optimization: The Matching Package for R, 42 J. STAT. SOFTWARE 1, 30 (2011). Genetic matching, by 
contrast, does not require that EPBR hold. Genetic matching also compares favorably to propensity score 
and Mahalanobis distance matching in terms of bias and mean squared error reduction; it also does not 
require any parametric assumptions. See generally id. (providing an overview of the GenMatch 
function); Sekhon, supra note 164 (noting that this procedure minimizes the largest covariate 












comparable in terms of a variety of specified confounding factors.166  
4. Covariates 
This analysis matches on eleven factors that, taken together, capture the 
process by which units are assigned to treatment.167 Specifically, the 
analysis includes three covariates that capture the preference alignment 
among agency, committee, and Congress (Agency-Committee Alignment, 
Committee-Chamber Alignment, and Agency-Chamber Alignment); one 
covariate that captures background political circumstances (Congress, i.e., 
the two-year period in the which the infraction occurred); three covariates 
that relate to agency characteristics (Executive Order, Regulatory Function, 
Defense / Foreign Affairs Function); three that measure the salience of the 
infraction (NYT Mentions, WSJ Mentions, Total Mentions); and one that 
captures the topic of the infraction (Subject Matter). 
As discussed supra in Part II, the relative preferences of Congress, the 
committee, and the agency all impact the committee’s decision to hold 
oversight hearings. These inter-actor relationships are captured in the 
Agency-Committee Alignment, Committee-Chamber Alignment, and 
Agency-Congress Alignment covariates.168  
Congress, a dummy variable taking values corresponding to the 102nd 
through 112th Congresses, is an especially important covariate, because it 
contains information concerning a wide variety of relevant features of the 
political system, e.g., the presence of divided government, the national 
																																																						
166.  See Alexis Diamond & Jasjeet Sekhon, Genetic Matching for Estimating Causal Effects: A 
General Multivariate Matching Method for Achieving Balance in Observational Studies, 95 REV. ECON. 
& STAT. 932 (2013). To provide a bit more technical detail regarding the research design: Wi is a binary 
treatment indicator, coded as 1 if infraction i was dealt with in an oversight hearing during the twelve 
months following its first mention, and zero otherwise. X is a (n x k) matrix of k covariates and n 
infractions. Yi(0) denotes the number of times infraction i would be mentioned in the four sources—IG 
reports, GAO lists, Times and Journal editorials—subsequent to the initial twelve month period if the 
infraction is not taken up in an oversight hearing during the twelve months following its initial mention. 
Yi(1) represents the number of times i  would be mentioned in these four sources if a hearing is held 
concerning i. Thus, Yi(0) and Yi(1) are “potential outcomes,” representing the likelihood of issue i 
reappearing, with and without hearings. Assuming unconfoundedness given the observed covariates—
i.e., that, conditional on the observed covariates, units are assigned to the treated group in a manner 
independent of outcomes—the average treatment effect for the treated is: τATT = E(Yi(1)−Yi(0) | Wi = 1. 
167. The use of the terms of “treatment” and “control” is consistent with the nomenclature in 
matching studies involving observational data in the social sciences. See, e.g., Gary King & Richard 
Nielsen, Why Propensity Scores Should Not Be Used for Matching 1 (Dec. 16, 2016) (working paper), 
https://perma.cc/WY9D-3NUG. I do not suggest that the two groups are identical, which is rarely 
possible in non-experimental settings.  
168. As in Part II, subcommittee preferences are estimated using subcommittee chairs’ ideal point 
estimates based on Common Space DW-NOMINATE scores, and agency preferences are captured by 
Johnson-Chen scores.  











mood, and the majority party leadership’s macro-level oversight goals. 
Executive Order captures whether the agency was created via an 
executive order, department secretarial order, or executive branch-initiated 
reorganization plan after 1946.169 According to William Howell and David 
Lewis, agencies that were created via unilateral executive action are 
typically designed so as to maximize presidential control.170 Given this 
Congress-subverting purpose, structural differences between agencies with 
a statutory basis and those without may influence the relative susceptibility 
of these two types of agencies to oversight. 
Regulatory Function reflects whether a majority of the programs that the 
agency administers are regulatory in nature.171 Whether an agency primarily 
performs a regulatory function may affect its assignment to treatment, as the 
often highly complex subject matter that regulatory agencies address may 
indicate that the legislature’s hidden information problem is particularly 
acute. Thus, oversight could be a more potent mechanism for information 
revelation for regulatory agencies. 
Defense / Foreign Affairs Function refers to whether the agency’s 
primary mission involves defense, foreign policy, international trade or 
foreign aid.172 Although the evidence is mixed, some scholars contend that 
Congress adopts a more deferential posture towards the executive branch 
concerning foreign affairs.173  
NYT Mentions and WSJ Mentions are event counts of the number of times 
these newspapers published a critical editorial concerning the agency 
																																																						
169.  These data were obtained from a dataset created by David Lewis for agencies created 
between 1946 and 1997. See David E. Lewis, Administrative Agency Insulation Data Set Code Book, 
IQSS DATAVERSE NETWORK, https://perma.cc/VV6G-P38P. I supplemented this dataset by researching 
agencies created between 1998 and 2012. Given that the creation of new agencies by unilateral executive 
action is a relatively recent phenomenon, agencies created before 1946 were coded as a zero.  
170.  William Howell & David E. Lewis, Agencies by Presidential Design, 64 J. POL. 1095, 1096 
(2002).  
171. See David E. Lewis, Testing Pendleton’s Premise: Do Political Appointees Make Worse 
Bureaucrats?, 69 J. POL. 1073 (2007) (providing a description of OMB PART Management Grades, 
which include program categories for every federal program in existence during these years, as well as 
information specifying the agency in each program is located). I consider an agency to have a primarily 
regulatory function if this dataset classifies at least half of the programs that the agency administers as 
regulatory. 
172. The contents of this variable were obtained from the David Lewis dataset for those agencies 
establised between 1946 and 1997, and were entered based on the author’s own determinations for all 
other agencies. See Lewis, supra note 169. 
173.  Compare LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995), with WILLIAM G. HOWELL & 
JON PEVEHOUSE, WHILE DANGERS GATHER: CONGRESSIONAL CHECKS ON PRESIDENTIAL WAR 
POWERS (2007); John Yoo, Politics as Law? The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, 
and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 851, 875 (2001). Bureaucracy experts also generally 
consider defense-focused agencies to have a more conservative outlook. Clinton & Lewis, supra note 












infraction in the twelve months following its first mention in any of the four 
sources. Taken together, these covariates provide a crude measure of issue 
salience and media or public attention from sources considered to be left- 
and right-of-center respectively. Total Mentions in Year t is an event count 
of the number times that all four sources criticize the agency regarding the 
infraction during the same twelve month period. This covariate provides an 
additional measure of issue salience among inside-the-Beltway actors. 
Since one reasonably could expect infractions that are the subject of 
intense media attention to be more likely subjects of oversight hearings, 
including these three media-related covariates helps ensure that 
observations in the treated and control groups are balanced in terms of 
public attention. That media attention to an issue typically declines after an 
initial burst of coverage should not affect these results, assuming that the 
rate of decline for issues that are the subject of oversight is equivalent to the 
rate of decline for issues that are not subject to oversight. 
Finally, Subject Matter is a categorical variable. Each infraction is 
assigned one of forty-two subject-matter codes, as listed in Footnote 91. 
I set the matching function to match exactly on the Congress and Subject 
Matter covariates and use the nearest match for all other covariates.174 
Through this procedure, each infraction on which a committee held a 
hearing was matched with an infraction for which oversight did not occur. 
For each matched pair, both the treated and control infraction involved the 
same subject area and occurred during the same Congress. Further, the two 
groups of observations are closely matched in terms of (i) the alignment of 
political preferences among the agency, committee, and Congress; (ii) 
whether the agency was created via executive order; whether the agency 
performs (iii) a mostly regulatory or (iv) defense or foreign-relations 
functions; and the number of instances that year in which (v) the New York 
Times editorial page; (vii) the Wall Street Journal editorial page; or (vii) 
either newspaper’s editorial page mentioned the infraction.175 
																																																						
174. Finding an exact match for each treatment unit on Congress is particularly desirable for two 
reasons. First, as previously detailed, Congress is a particularly meaningful covariate because it captures 
a wide variety of features in the political environment. Second, the temporal, discrete nature of this 
variable means that, in some circumstances, “close enough” is not adequate. Whereas, for instance, the 
analyst might be satisfied with a match where the control and treated units have slightly different values 
for, say, Agency-Congress Alignment, the same cannot necessarily be said for a pair where, e.g., one unit 
is in the Democrat-led 103rd Congress and the other is in the Republican-led 104th Congress. 
175. To test for post-matching balance between the treated and control groups, I ran paired sample 
t-tests, for differences in means, and bootstrap Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, for differences in 
distributions, concerning each covariate. Across these tests, the lowest p-value reported is 0.129, which 
suggests that, using a strict p > 0.10 criterion, the matched groups can be considered balanced on the 
covariates. 
The matching function also substantially reduces standardized bias, or the mean difference between 











Having created the matched groups and asssessed balance,176 I then fit a 
series of logistic regression models on the matched data. These models 
include all of the previously mentioned covariates along with a dichotomous 
indicator variable taking the value of 1 if a hearing was held within twelve 
months of the infraction’s first mention. The outcome variable is whether 
the infraction is mentioned against in the thirteen to twenty-four months 
following its first mention; standard errors are clustered by committee. 
Before proceeding to the analysis, several qualifications are in order. 
Most importantly, while the eleven included covariates capture significant 
considerations, they do not exhaust the potential ways in which infractions 
subject to oversight could differ from those that are ignored. For instance, 
infractions vary in importance to key donors or interest groups, not to 
mention as pet causes among legislators; yet operationalizing variation of 
these types is beyond this Article’s scope—and perhaps beyond the realm 
of possibility. Further, several of the included covariates are rough 
simulacra for the underlying concepts they seek to capture. For example, 
the number of references to the infraction in two major newspaper editorial 
pages is a crude proxy for salience, particularly as the media landscape 
fractured during the study period. While acknowledging these 
shortcomings—which in some form are present in many observational 
studies—this Article nonetheless provides a first-cut assessment of a key 
potential mechanism for congressional influence in the administrative state. 
C. Results 
With each infraction for which a hearing was convened well-matched 
with an otherwise similar infraction for which oversight did not occur, direct 
measurement of the impact of congressional oversight on agency recidivism 
is possible. The top row in Figure 4, labeled “Model 1 (1991–2012),” 
reports the estimated effect of holding at least one hearing on whether there 
is at least one critical mention of the infraction in any of the four sources 
during the following twelve months, along with the associated 95% 
																																																						
the two groups divided by the standard deviation in the treated group, for all covariates. Prior to 
matching, the standardized differences for three out of the eleven covariates exceed 20%. See Paul 
Rosenbaum & Donald Rubin, Constructing a Control Group Using Multivariate Matched Sampling 
Methods that Incorporate the Propensity Score, 39 AM. STATISTICIAN 33, 36 (1985) (classifying 
standardized differences greater than 20% as large). Post-matching, the largest standardized difference, 
for Defense / Foreign Affairs Function, is 1.0%. The fact that such close balance was achieved on these 
covariates presents a strong case for unconfoundedness. Even though treatment was not randomly 
assigned, one may say that it was not assigned on the basis of these covariates, which capture a diverse 
set of factors related to the political climate, committee and agency political preferences, media attention 
and overall issue salience. 












confidence interval. The second row, labeled “Model 2 (1991–2012),” 
reports this estimate only for the most politically salient infractions, i.e., 
those involving agency rulemakings, grant decisions, the agency’s posture 
toward client groups and regulated groups, and appointee competence and 
ethics.177 Subsequent rows show the estimated effects from running separate 
models (all of which include the full set of infractions) for each combination 
of President and House party majority during the 1991–2012 period.178 
 
Figure 4: Effects of Hearings on Future Infractions, by President & House 
of Representative Majority Party 
 
 
Unit of analysis: agency infraction. Treatment: whether at least one hearing 
was held concerning the infraction in the twelve months following the 
infraction’s mention. Outcome variable: whether the infraction is mentioned at 
least once in the twelve months following treatment. Study period: 102nd–112th 
Congresses (1991–2012). Bars signify 95% confidence intervals, which were 
derived using committee-clustered standard errors. 
Full model contains 14,431 observations and 5202 treated observations (all 
of which were matched), and 4992 unweighted matched observations, i.e., 
control-group observations. (Two hundred and ten control-group observations 
were matched with more than one treated observation; an additional 4237 
control observations were not matched with any treated observation, and thus 
were excluded.) Models estimated via logistic regression. 
 
																																																						
177.  Recall from Section II.B that these subject areas correspond to categories 12–23 and 35–42 
in Footnote 91). 
178.  These models were run without the Congress covariate. 
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As Figure 4 shows, when a hearing is held concerning an infraction, that 
infraction is less likely to reappear in the four sources than are similar 
infractions that do not receive oversight attention. Overall, oversight 
attention is associated with an 18.5% reduction in the likelihood of 
recurrence across all infractions (Model 1). For the most politically salient 
infractions (Model 2), the estimated reduction is 14.6%—although the 
associated 95% confidence interval crosses zero, indicating that we cannot 
reject the null result at this level. 
Remarkably, these results persist during periods of both unified and 
divided government. Figure 4 also shows that hearings are associated with 
a 7.3% to 22.9% reduction in agency recidivism for all partisan 
combinations during this period (although two of these estimates are not 
statistically significant). Contrary to expectations based on the view that 
inter-branch competition will be most intense when different parties control 
the branches,179 there does not appear to be a discernable difference between 
the recidivism rates in periods of unified versus divided government. 
To put the magnitude of these effects in perspective, infractions that are 
not subject to hearings have a 40.9% likelihood of recurrence in the next 
year; infractions that are subject to hearings have a 33.3% likelihood of 
recurrence. To better understand how this average 18.5% reduction in 
agency recidivism affects the absolute number of agency infractions, Figure 
5 provides the predicted probabilities of infractions that were subject to 
hearings reappearing in the infractions dataset in the thirteen to twenty-four 
months after their appearance, compared to the predicted probabilities for 
infractions that Congress ignored. As the estimates in the bottom-left corner 
of Figure 5 show, infractions that appear once in a given year and are not 
subject to hearings have a 33% predicted probability of recurrence, whereas 
infractions that appear once in a given year but are subject to hearings have 
a 25% probability of recurrence—a 24.2% reduction for infractions that 
appear only once in a given year. 
As Figure 5 illustrates, infractions that appear more than once in a given 
year are more likely to reappear in subsequent years, perhaps because 
infractions that receive greater attention from the four sources are more 
difficult to resolve. Still, for infractions that are mentioned between two and 
seven times in one year, the probability that the infraction is mentioned the 
next year is lower when oversight occurs. In most cases, this lower 
likelihood of recurrence is statistically significant, as the lack of overlap in 
most of the 95% confidence intervals in Figure 5 conveys. 
 
																																																						
179.  See Daryl Levinson & Richard Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. 












Figure 5: Predicated Probability of Infraction Reappearing in Dataset in 
Year Following First Mention 
 
 
Figure reports simulated predicted probability of an infraction 
reappearing in the dataset in the thirteen to twenty-four months following 
its appearance. X-axis denotes the number of times that the infraction 
appears in the dataset following its first appearance. Bars signify 95% 
confidence intervals. Quantities of interest estimated by running 1000 
simulations in Zelig using a logistic regression model and holding 
Subcommittee Preferences and Agency Preferences covariates at their 
means; Executive Order, Regulatory Function, and Def. / For. Affairs 
Function at their modes; and NYT Mentions and WSJ Mentions at their 
medians. See King, et al., Zelig, supra Figure 3. Unit of analysis: agency 
infractions. (Infractions from all 42 categories in Footnote 91 are 
included.) Bars signify 95% confidence intervals, which were derived 
using committee-clustered standard errors. 











Assessing whether an 18.5% reduction indicates that oversight hearings 
are consequential raises the question: Compared to what? As discussed in 
Section I.A, supra, Congress possesses various carrots and sticks for 
influencing agency behavior. The importance of these other tools, ranging 
from informal legislator-administrator contacts to GAO reports detailing 
agency misbehavior, should not be discounted. On the other hand, these 
tools may derive their impact, at least in part, from the fact that they are 
deployed in the shadow of potential oversight hearings. Regardless, this Part 
simply reports the marginal effect of oversight hearings, whether those 
hearings occur in isolation or in combination with other means of influence. 
Naturally, the lack of quantifiable “success rates” for these other tools 
hinders the assessment of the relative impact of oversight hearings 
compared to these other measures. In absolute terms, the magnitude of an 
18.5% reduction is in the eye of the beholder. At least to this observer, 
though, the notion that a small subset of legislators may be able to exert 
influence on the administrative state—which is alternatively considered a 
co-equal fourth branch of government or the object of growing presidential 
control—without passing a statute is noteworthy. 
Conducting similar analyses for limited subsets of these infractions data 
yields similar results as reported in the full model—albeit often just on the 
wrong side of the conventionally accepted p < 0.05 level of statistical 
significance. As discussed above, Model 2 in Figure 4 reports that oversight 
hearings are associated with an estimated 14.6% reduction in the recurrence 
rate for a politically salient subset of infractions (with a standard error of 
0.084 associated with this 0.146 point estimate).  
Running separate models for infractions in each of the forty-two subject 
areas yields negative estimates for almost all models. Almost all these 
estimates are far from conventionally accepted levels of statistical 
significance, however, perhaps because of the relatively low number of 
observations in most categories. Accordingly, I reclassify the forty-two 
subject areas into seven “super-categories,” each of which contains 
sufficient observations for analysis, and run a separate model for each of the 
seven super-categories. Figure 6 reports the effect estimates and 
corresponding 95% confidence intervals for each. Although, as Figure 6 
shows, most of these intervals just barely include positive numbers, and thus 
are not statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level, all of the estimates 

















Unit of analysis: agency infraction. Unit of analysis: agency 
infractions. (Infractions from all forty-two categories in Footnote 91 are 
included.) Treatment: whether at least one hearing was held concerning 
the infraction in the twelve months following the infraction’s mention. 
Outcome variable: whether the infraction is mentioned at least once in 
the 12 months following treatment. Study period: 102nd–112th 
Congresses (1991–2012). Models estimated via logistic regression. Bars 
signify 95% confidence intervals, which were derived using committee-
clustered standard errors. 
 
The fact that oversight reduces bureaucratic recividism is noteworthy 
and, for those that believe that Congress ought to play an expanded role in 
administration, encouraging. Coupling with the findings in Part II 
concerning when oversight will occur, this result suggests several 
implications concerning the role of Congress in administration.  
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
The basic conclusion from the preceding analyses is that, when 
undertaken, oversight can have a significant effect on agency behavior, but 
political constraints prevent oversight from occurring in many instances. 











The statement that oversight is conditionally impactful may seem a bit 
vexing. On the one hand, Part III demonstrates that oversight can be highly 
consequential, reducing the rate of recurrence of infractions by 18.5%. 
Considering that oversight hearings are sometimes dismissed as little more 
than venues for political posturing, this finding is noteworthy, and should 
be cause for optimism among those that see congressional engagement with 
the administrative state as important.180 Moreover, Part II shows that outlier 
committees conduct oversight less frequently, mitigating the charge that 
committee-based oversight may distort agency action away from the median 
legislator’s preferences.  
On the other hand, Part II also suggests that principal-agent issues 
inherent in the relationship between Congress and its committees push 
overseers to be highly selective concerning which infractions they address. 
(Namely, oversight tends to increase as agency and congressional 
preferences diverge, per Hypothesis 1, and as committee and congressional 
preferences converge, per Hypothesis 3. Agency-committee convergence 
also may be associated with increased oversight, per Hypothesis 2b, 
although the lack of statistical significance in some models counsels in favor 
of caution here.) While the existence of a bifurcated principal does clip the 
wings of outlier committees, tempering their influence over administative 
outcomes, it also leads to fewer subjects being covered in hearings relative 
to what would be addressed in a system in which committees perfectly 
mirror floor preferences. Thus, committee oversight arguably does not fully 
reflect Congress’s priorities. 
What is one to make of these findings? The following sections discuss 
implications of the results presented supra. 
A. Committee-Chamber Relations 
Congress-agency interactions are best thought of not as a clear principal-
agent relationship, but instead as a relationship where the cooperation of 
two actors—the committee and Congress, which together can be considered 
the principal—may be necessary for effective oversight. According to J.R. 
DeShazo and Jody Freeman, congressional involvement in administration 
involves a “double delegation,” in which Congress transfers ex ante 
																																																						
180.  Because this analysis only considers the effects of completed oversight hearings, it may 
underestimate oversight’s impact. Much like the threat of litigation brings potential defendants—
mindful of the frictional costs involved in a legal defense—to the settlement table, the threat of oversight 
hearings—with their own attendant frictional costs—may convince agencies to comply with committee 
demands. In this way, oversight’s “second face of power” influences agency behavior without the need 
for any observable action by the committee. Cf. Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of 












policymaking authority to agencies, and entrusts responsibility for ex post 
monitoring of this first delegation to congressional committees and 
subcommittees—with principal-agent problems ingrained in both 
delegations.181  
Concerning this second delegation, the finding in Part II that preference 
divergence between committees and their parent chamber is associated with 
less frequent oversight suggests that slack exists in the principal-agent 
relationship between Congress and its committees. The functional split 
between committees, which are responsible for oversight, and Congress, 
which alone is authorized to punish agencies should they ignore committee 
overseers, limits the set of topics on which strategic committees will engage 
on oversight. 
This feature of Congress has implications concerning the 
comprehensiveness of oversight, raising questions concerning the 
importance of oversight as a means of congressional control over the 
administrative state.182 Consider how oversight activity would differ if, 
hypothetically, there were no principal-agent problem between Congress 
and its committees, i.e., if committee preferences perfectly mirrored the 
floor. The status quo promotes the odd result of committees devoting less 
attention to overseeing agencies with differing preferences than the 
committee, because the committee recognizes that agencies with differing 
preferences are less likely to comply with committee demands following a 
hearing and more likely to court legislative sanctions. But if committee 
preferences perfectly matched those of Congress, committees would not 
need to consider whether holding hearings would awaken a slumbering 
Congress to move policy away from committee preferences. Instead, 
agencies with policy preferences that are far from Congress’s (and its 
committees’) preferences would receive greater oversight attention, and 
agencies whose preferences align with Congress’s (and its committees’) 
preferences would receive less attention. 
Slack in the principal-agent relationship between Congress and its 
committees prevents this more sensible behavior from occurring. The 
presence of a bifurcated congressional structure limits committees’ 
																																																						
181.  DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 15, at 1444–46. 
182.  See Beermann, supra note 11, at 142–43 (noting that oversight “may allow for too much 
deviation from the terms of the legislative program and from the preferences of Congress as a whole 
given that oversight does not include the discipline of public majority votes in Congress. . . . There are 
reasons to be wary of a system [allowing] . . . small groups within Congress to shape administrative 
action.”); DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 15, at 1447 (“Double delegation creates a serious risk . . . 
that agency decision-making . . . will be driven by the interests of small sub-majorities of Congress.”); 
Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional 
Defense of Judicial Power Over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1291 (2002) 
(doubting that “oversight committees accurately reflect the views of the House or Senate as a whole”). 











oversight activity, relative to the amount of activity that would occur if 
committees were perfect agents of Congress. With this bifurcated principal, 
a strategic committee will restrict the set of agencies or topics that it 
monitors, as the committee’s preferences diverge from those of other 
relevant actors. Under certain conditions, a committee with either a 
sufficiently different political outlook than Congress or than an agency 
within its jurisdiction may choose to ignore agency behavior that the 
committee opposes. Thus, two principal-agent problems hamper Congress’s 
ability to control the administrative state: (i) Congress’s delegation of 
policymaking power to agencies leads to one form of agency cost, and (ii) 
the branch’s delegation of the task of monitoring the administrative state to 
its committees leads to a second form.183 
B. Majoritarianism 
A pessimistic reading of these findings suggests that Congress cannot 
control delegated powers via committee-based action, since the presence of 
a bifurcated principal leads committees to ignore agencies that Congress, in 
the aggregate, would prefer to actively monitor. Under this view, 
Congress’s “double delegation”—of policymaking authority to agencies 
and of policy oversight to its committees—suggests a failure to ensure that 
policy outcomes reflect Congress’s will both via detailed statutory 
enactments and through ex post monitoring that reflects the preferences of 
the legislative branch.184 
A more balanced interpretation, however, notes the presence of a subtle 
majoritarian dynamic in the oversight dilemma. As Part II shows, 
committees devote greater attention to oversight when their preferences are 
more closely aligned with those of the parent chamber. That committees’ 
oversight decisions are made with an eye towards the larger legislature 
indicates a degree of committee responsiveness to its principal. 
This responsiveness provides a rejoinder to scholars that, pointing to the 
unrepresentative nature of congressional committees, contend that the 
President ought to possess greater power over the administrative state.185 
The argument for greater presidential control at Congress’s expense often 
begins with the premise that “congressional” control really means control 
																																																						
183. Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and Time Consistency: A 
Comment on Macey, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 111 (1992) (referring to a “drift tradeoff” in the design of 
mechanisms for continued congressional involvement in administration).  
184.  See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 15, at 1444–46. 
185.  See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. 












by committees.186 Given the supposed unrepresentativeness of committees 
and their susceptibility to interest group capture,187 the argument continues, 
greater presidential control of administration is preferable to an expanded 
role for congressional committees.188 
The results reported in Part II cast doubt on this critique. That oversight 
increases as committee and chamber preferences converge suggests instead 
that committee-based oversight involves some measure of accountability to 
Congress. Unrepresentative committees are not given free rein to impose 
their views on agencies. Rather, the prospect of committee-disfavored 
legislative action deters outlier committees from attempting to influence 
agencies within their jurisdictions via the oversight process. In this way, the 
presence of a bifurcated congressional principal serves as a majoritarian 
check on unrepresentative committees. 
C. Jurisdictional Redundancy 
To some observers, the fact that unrepresentative committees are less 
likely to use the oversight process to pull agencies towards their preferences 
may appear to be faint praise for the system. After all, this finding implies 
that agencies situated within the jurisdictions of unrepresentative 
committees may enjoy some degree of unfettered discretion. This feature, 
however, also suggests a benefit of Congress’s fragmented oversight 
system, in which multiple committees, in both chambers, share jurisdiction 
for many agencies.189 According to DeShazo and Freeman, “Congress is 
best viewed as a collection of rivals who vie for control over power 
delegated to agencies.”190 But while DeShazo and Freeman consider this 
competition among unrepresentative committees and subcommittees as 
creating “risk that submajorities will ultimately direct agency 
implementation,”191 the findings presented in this Article mollify their 
conclusion. The presence of multiple committees with overlapping 
jurisdictions may mitigate the possibility that preference divergence 
between the legislative branch and any one particular committee will leave 
																																																						
186.  See Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective 
Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1471, 1522–23 (2015). 
187.  See Kagan, supra note 122, at 2336 (stating that committees have a “far more tenuous 
connection to national majoritarian preferences” than does the White House); Einer R. Elhauge, Does 
Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 42 (1991) (similar). 
188.  See Calabresi, supra note 185, at 51 (“Congressional committee chairs are in many ways 
rival executives to the cabinet secretaries whose departments and personal offices they oversee.”). 
189.  See KING, supra note 84, at 6. 
190.  DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 15, at 1446. 
191.  Id. at 1444. 











some agencies unmonitored.  
This finding speaks to a debate regarding the impact of committees’ 
exclusive jurisdictional “property rights” on congressional capacity. 
Whereas one group of scholars critiques committee jurisdictional 
redundancy as inefficient, discouraging congressional involvement in 
administration and thus allowing the executive to act with fewer 
congressional checks,192 others acknowledge benefits to jurisdictional 
fragmentation including the decreased susceptibility of multiple entities to 
interest group capture and the increased likelihood that problems will be 
discovered with redundant safeguards.193 The existence of a bifurcated 
principal—which limits committee oversight activity where the relevant 
committee’s ideological outlook diverges from that of the target agency or 
Congress—suggests an additional benefit of duplicative committees; 
redundancy increases the likelihood that for at least one committee, the 
preference relationships between committee, chamber, and agency that are 
associated with more frequent oversight will be properly aligned. 
D. Checking the President 
These findings also suggest that a reconsideration of the dominant 
perspective concerning executive-congressional power dynamics is in 
order. Part III provides a partial corrective to popular accounts of the current 
balance of powers; Part II offers an institutional design strategy to militate 
against further executive aggrandizement. 
The notion that the executive branch plays an outsized role in 
governance, exercising legislative and judicial functions with few perceived 
checks from Congress or the courts, has gained wide currency in recent 
years.194 Presidential self-aggrandizement, Congress’s routine delegation of 
																																																						
192. See Joshua D. Clinton, David E. Lewis, & Jennifer L. Selin, Influencing the Bureaucracy: The 
Irony of Congressional Oversight, 58 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 387 (2014); Patricia Wald & Neil Kinkopf, 
Putting Separation of Powers into Practice: Reflections on Senator Schumer’s Essay, 1 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 41, 47 (2007); Beermann, supra note 11, at 122; NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS, 
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 104–07 (2004).  
193.  See Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and 
Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655, 1691–99 (2006). Cf. RICHARD 
POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS: INTELLIGENCE REFORM IN THE WAKE OF 9/11 36 (2005) 
(arguing that, without competition, agencies may grow complacent). 
194.  See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2606 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(noting “the continuing aggrandizement of the Executive Branch”); City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 
290, 315 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he danger posed by the growing power of the 
administrative state cannot be dismissed.”); supra note 14 (collecting citations to scholarly work). 
During the Obama administration, these concerns emanated mostly from conservatives. See, e.g., Josh 
Blackman, Presidential Maladministration, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). With the change 












lawmaking functions to executive agencies, and the Supreme Court’s 
willingness to abide these broad delegations so long as Congress provides a 
bare “intelligible principle” to guide agency policymaking, when taken 
together, all reinforce the view of an executive ascendant, with Congress 
imposing few restrictions on its power.195 
While misgivings regarding trends in the relative power of the political 
branches are legitimate, the narrative of an enfeebled Congress unable to 
check an unbounded executive (except through the rare passage of new 
laws) is deficient.196 As Part III of this Article shows, this account ignores 
Congress’s extra-legislative powers, including committee oversight of 
executive agencies, as a means of controlling administrative outcomes. 
Taken in tandem with Part III, Part II demonstrates that the structure and 
characteristics of the members of the committee system impact Congress’s 
ability to conduct oversight, and thus to exercise control over the executive 
branch. Findings that certain institutional design characteristics facilitate 
oversight may motivate Congress to reorganize along those lines to more 
vigorously check the White House.197 
E. Administrative Democracy 
Whereas some scholars worry that the President plays too large of a role 
in the administrative state, others claim that holes in the President’s control 
over administration leave agencies without sufficient democratic checks. At 
																																																						
aggrandizement likely will flip. See Adrian Vermeule, Two Futures for Administrative Law, NOTICE & 
COMMENT BLOG (Nov. 30, 2016), https://perma.cc/FU58-UMGY. 
195.  See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472–75 (2001) (delineating the 
expansive terms of the nondelegation doctrine); Watts, supra note 117, at 1003 (noting Congress’s 
sweeping delegations to agencies); Kagan, supra note 122 (describing the President’s growing role in 
the administrative state). 
196.  While no scholar has, to my knowledge, argued that the executive is completely unbound, 
many have noted a massive transfer in power, with supposedly few checks, from Capitol Hill to the 
White House. See supra note 14; see also Eric Posner, The Executive Unbound, Trump Ed., 
ERICPOSNER.COM (Feb. 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/GRR3-J29H (stating that “[w]hile . . . some passages 
[of The Executive Unbound] may have led readers to think that the book imagines that the president is 
subject to literally no constraints from Congress and the courts, that was never the argument”). 
197.  Would legislators want to reorganize Congress’s committee system to better control the 
executive branch? In light of the current unified Republican control of the political branches, the notion 
that legislators desire to better check the President may seem far-fetched. See Levinson & Pildes, supra 
note 179. Even in the current partisan climate, however, majority-party members of Congress possess 
an electoral incentive to monitor the executive branch—lest problems fester and voters blame 
incumbents in both of the political branches. Further, some legislators, motivated by a sense of 
institutional loyalty, genuinely may consider recalibrating the balance-of-powers to be a worthy policy 
goal in itself. See SCHICKLER, supra note 131 (on entrepreneurial legislators pursuing institutional 
reforms based on a combination of personal ambition and concern over Congress’s institutional 
prestige); accord David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law, 85 U. 
CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).  











least since the New Deal era, judges and commentators have charged that 
Congress’s delegations of policymaking authority to administrative 
agencies create a democratically unaccountable “fourth branch” of 
government.198  
Since that period, a central project of administrative law has involved 
reconciling the practical reality of a technocratic administrative state with 
democratic, liberal-legalistic values.199 In previous generations, this effort 
emphasized designing administrative procedures to encourage public 
participation in administrative decision-making.200 Later expansion of 
access to the courts helped ensure that agencies adhere to these public-
minded procedural requirements.201  
More recently, scholars have argued that the fact that a democratically 
elected President heads the executive branch provides some redress for the 
administrative state’s supposed “democratic deficit.”202 For instance, Elena 
Kagan (writing years prior to her investiture) claimed that “presidential 
control of administration . . . possesses advantages over any alternative 
control device in advancing . . . core democratic values.”203  
Indeed, the administrative state’s connection to a democratically elected 
President provides a rationale for the judiciary’s deferential posture in 
reviewing agency activity. Most notably, in granting agencies wide latitude 
in interpreting ambiguous statutes, the Chevron Court explained: 
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief 
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of 
the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the 
competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not 
resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged 
with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.204 
To the extent that Chevron and its progeny are rooted in these dual links 
between (i) agencies and the President and (ii) the President and the public, 
																																																						
198.  See Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
437, 440 (2003). 
199.  See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“[O]ur jurisprudience has been 
driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing 
and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power 
under broad general directives.”). 
200.  See Nicholas Bagley, Remedial Restraint in Administrative Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 253, 
260–65 (2017). 
201.  See id. 
202.  See id. at 260 (referring to this concept as a “democracy deficit”). 
203.  Kagan, supra note 122, at 2332; see also Calabresi, supra note 185, at 23 (1995); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 500 (1987). 












skepticism regarding either of these links calls into question the doctrine’s 
continued viability. The Court raised such doubts in Free Enterprise Fund. 
In that case, the Court stated that “[t]he growth of the Executive Branch, 
which now wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily life, 
heightens the concern that it may slip from the Executive’s control, and thus 
from that of the people.”205 By this view, the President provides the 
democratic bridge between the administrative state and the people—and this 
connection is precarious.206 Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch 
express similar concerns.207 
The notion that only presidential control can redress the administrative 
state’s democratic deficit is puzzling. Ex post congressional involvement in 
administration is real and significant; committee-based oversight provides 
Congress with an ongoing means of influencing agency behavior. 
Administrative lawyers and scholars have pushed for changes in 
administrative procedures, judicial doctrine, and executive branch 
structures as means of increasing democratic accountability in the 
administrative state.208 Greater attention to redesigning congressional 
structures to facilitate oversight could play a similar function.  
The prospect of Congress filling gaps in the other branches’ oversight is 
particularly promising in areas in which courts are particularly reticent to 
act. For instance, under Heckler v. Chaney, “agency decisions to refuse 
enforcement” are “general[ly] unsuitab[le] for judicial review.”209 This 
doctrine places a theoretically infinite set of non-actions outside of the 
courts’ field of vision. Yet Congress holds no such qualms about probing 
agencies’ decisions to refrain from acting.210 
																																																						
205.  Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010) (Roberts, C.J.). 
206.  Chief Justice Roberts elaborated on these views in dissent. See City of Arlington, Tex. v. 
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President could . . . supervise so broad a swath of regulatory activity.”) (quotation and citation omitted) 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 315 (“It would be a bit much to describe [agency discretion under 
Chevron] as ‘the very definition of tyranny,’ but the danger posed by the growing power of the 
administrative state cannot be dismissed.”) (citation omitted). 
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overseen and sanctioned the growth of an administrative system that concentrates the power to make 
laws and the power to enforce them in the hands of a vast and unaccountable administrative apparatus 
that finds no comfortable home in our constitutional structure.”) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Add to [the 
combination of legislative, judicial, and executive functions in agencies] the fact that . . . agencies wield 
vast power and are overseen by political appointees (but often receive little effective oversight from the 
chief executive to whom they nominally report), and you have a pretty potent mix.”) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). 
208.  See Jud Mathews, Minimally Democratic Administrative Law, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 605 
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210.  See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, How Credit Suisse Got Off Easy, NEWSWEEK (June 19, 2014), 











I do not wish to seem Pollyannaish about the ability of oversight to 
“solve” the democratic deficit. An 18.5% reduction is not earth-shattering. 
But neither should we ignore Congress’s function as watchdog over the 
administrative state, which provides a measure—albeit limited—of 
democratic accountability to agency decision-making. Congressional 
oversight is one tool among many that can push agencies towards greater 
public accountability. 
CONCLUSION 
Through its oversight function, Congress plays an important—and often 
overlooked—role in the administrative state after it passes laws. Although 
hearings do not directly compel agencies to act, the signal they provide to 
both targeted agencies and the larger legislative branch concerning the 
prospect of future legislative sanctions following continued non-compliance 
may persuade agencies to conform to committee preferences. In this way, 
Congress’s ability to conduct oversight can be placed among the branch’s 
set of persuasive “soft powers.”211 Whereas scholarship focused on 
lawmaking, the ex ante design of administrative procedures, and other 
formal means of control concludes that Congress has ceded considerable 
control over administration to the White House,212 this Article shows that, 
when certain conditions are met, ex post oversight can be remarkably 
impactful. 
This conclusion is subject to several caveats. Section III.B 
acknowledges, while infractions in the “treatment” and “control” groups are 
substantially similar in important respects, they are not identical. (Neither 
could they be.) Because my research design aggregates individual 
infractions and hearings, each of which undoubtedly has unique 
characteristics, in the service of general conclusions, it necessarily ignores 
nuances present in any particular episode. Although this project is therefore 
incomplete, there is value in a first-cut assessment of the impact of oversight 
hearings in toto. 
Further, that oversight can be effective does not imply that it is efficient. 
Congress has many tools to influence agency behavior, from whistleblower 
statutes and the design of administrative structures to convention-based 
legislative vetoes and the newly reinvigorated Congressional Review Act. 
Whether oversight hearings lead to greater welfare gains within Congress 
																																																						
https://perma.cc/2YMD-ZX4T (reporting that the DOJ, after a long period of inaction, entered into a 
plea agreement with a bank to pay a then-record criminal tax fine, shortly following an oversight hearing 
at which Sen. Carl Levin’s “public bashing” of the DOJ “rattled” a DOJ witness).  
211.  Cf. Chafetz, supra note 11; Gersen & Posner, supra note 17.  













than other mechanisms is beyond the Article’s scope. 
Although examining connections between oversight activity and the 
relative alignment of Congress, its committees, and executive agencies is a 
positive and descriptive project, the implications of this work are 
prescriptive. In an era of growing judicial concerns about democratic 
control over administration, oversight holds promise as a means of 
involving the popular branch in administrative decision-making. Further, 
Congress can tailor its internal institutional design to enhance the role that 
the branch plays in administration. If Congress desires to strengthen its hand 
in administration, this Article provides a blueprint that shows how to do so. 
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